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UNFULFILLED PROMISES: DISCRIMINATION AND
THE DENIAL OF ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS
UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Jennifer Bennett Shinall*
INTRODUCTION
[S]omeday our grandkids will ask us if there was really a time when
America discriminated against people who get sick.  Because that is
something this law has ended for good.
President Barack Obama, Remarks on the King v. Burwell decision
by the U.S. Supreme Court (June 25, 2015)1
When President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law on March 23, 2010, he pro-
claimed that the Act would provide Americans with “basic security
when it comes to their health care.”2  According to President Obama,
the signing of the Act represented the first step in fulfilling his cam-
paign promise of “affordable, universal healthcare for every single
American”3 and the first step in transforming the receipt of health
care from a luxury into a “right.”4  Achieving this transformation was
to be famously realized through the establishment of the Health In-
surance Marketplace,5 which would offer low-cost plans that would
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. The author extends a special thanks to
her colleagues at the Vanderbilt Institute for Obesity & Metabolism for their encouragement in
pursuing this project and to participants in the 2015 Obesity Week Conference for their helpful
feedback.
1. Remarks on the United States Supreme Court Ruling on the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 460, at 1 (June 25, 2015) [hereinafter
Obama’s Remarks on the ACA].
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with a Flour-
ish, Mar. 23, 2010, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html
(quoting President Barack Obama).
3. See Carlos Lozada, Obamacare Is Now This President’s Legacy.  But It Started Almost on a
Whim, WASH. POST, June 26, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2015/
06/26/obamacare-is-now-this-presidents-legacy-but-it-started-almost-on-a-whim/ (quoting Presi-
dent Barack Obama, Remarks at the Families USA Conference: The Time Has Come for Uni-
versal Health Care (Jan. 25, 2007), reprinted in Obama’s Speech at Families USA, WALL. ST. J.,
Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116975088437787994).
4. Obama’s Remarks on the ACA, supra note 1, at 1. R
5. Of course, at the beginning, implementation of the health exchanges appeared more infa-
mous than famous due to the numerous glitches and problems associated with the healthcare.gov
website. See generally Larry Buchanan et al., How Healthcare.gov Was Supposed To Work and
1235
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provide all “essential health benefits”6 to consumers, by ending unjus-
tified rate hiking and common discriminatory insurance practices.
Guaranteed essential health benefits under the ACA include mental
health treatment, prescription drugs, rehabilitative services, chronic
disease management, and pediatric services.7  Simultaneously, the
ACA prohibits discriminatory health care practices on the basis of
race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability.8
Yet, in spite of the ACA’s guarantees, some individuals still endure
discriminatory practices in the health insurance marketplace that
leave them unable to afford essential health benefits.  Among the
groups that have thus far fallen victim to the unfulfilled promises of
the nondiscrimination and essential health benefit guarantees of the
ACA are children with special needs—even though pediatric services
are specifically enumerated in the Act as an essential health benefit.9
For example, a group of public health scholars recently conducted a
state-by-state review of pediatric coverage in benchmark plans, which
reflect each state’s determination of the minimum level of coverage
necessary to comply with the ACA’s statutory requirements and ac-
companying Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations.10  The
authors found many notable coverage disparities in state benchmark
plan requirements for pediatric care with the most disturbing gaps in
coverage experienced by children seeking treatment for autism, hear-
ing impairments, and speech impairments.11
In addition to children with special needs, transgender individuals
have also been the subject of popular attention regarding inconsisten-
cies of care in the post-ACA regime. Although the ACA explicitly
prohibits sex discrimination,12 and the HHS has interpreted the prohi-
bition to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity,13 the
How It Didn’t, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/10/13/us/how-
the-federal-exchange-is-supposed-to-work-and-how-it-didnt.html (providing an interactive guide
to the marketplace).
6. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012) (defining essential health benefits).
7. Id. § 18022(b)(1).
8. Id. § 18116(a).
9. Id. § 18022(b)(1)(J).
10. Aimee M. Grace et al., The ACA’s Pediatric Essential Health Benefit Has Resulted in a
State-by-State Patchwork of Coverage with Exclusions, 33 HEALTH AFF. 2136 (2014).
11. See id. at 2137–41; see also Sara Rosenbaum & Kathleen Noonan, HHS Proposed Policy
on Non-Discrimination: Does It Adequately Protect Children?, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Feb. 19,
2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/02/19/hhs-proposed-policy-on-non-discrimination-does-
it-adequately-protect-children/.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
13. See Memorandum from Andrew Boron, Dir. of Ill. Dep’t of Ins. on Healthcare for Trans-
gender Individuals To All Insurers (July 28, 2014), http://insurance.illinois.gov/cb/2014/CB2014-
10.pdf; Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Maya Ru-
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guaranteed benefits and level of protection that transgender individu-
als receive vary by state.14  Not every state benchmark plan currently
guarantees coverage of mental health counseling, hormone therapy,
or gender reassignment surgery for transgendered individuals, which
leads to jurisdiction-based inequities of care.15  Once again, the un-
lucky individuals living in less generous states only have the ACA’s
unfulfilled promises to comfort them.16
Still, perhaps the largest group of individuals who continue to en-
counter widespread coverage denials and financial barriers to medical
treatment—in spite of the applicable essential health benefits and
nondiscrimination guarantees of the ACA—have remained largely
unnoticed by both scholars and the media.  Six years after the passage
of the ACA, many obese individuals remain unable to access any type
of medical weight-loss treatment because over one-half of state bench-
mark plans deny coverage for those treatments.17  And this wide-
pert, Fed. Policy Dir., Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights (July 12, 2012), http://www.scribd.com/doc/
102169872/HHS-Response-1557-7-12-12; Matthew Heinz & Juliet K. Choi, Enhancing Health
Care Protections for LGBT Individuals, WHITE HOUSE.GOV (Apr. 17, 2014), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/04/17/enhancing-health-care-protections-lgbt-individuals.
14. See Daphna Stroumsa, The State of Transgendered Health Care: Policy, Law, and Medical
Frameworks, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Mar. 2014, at e31, e34–36.
[C]overage denial based on being transgender as a preexisting condition will be banned
under the ACA starting in 2014. To what extent and how promptly these protections
will be implemented, and whether they will lead to higher rates of coverage for mental
health services, cross-sex hormone therapy, or gender affirmation surgery, remains to
be seen. These advances, do not, however, provide an explicit and directed protection
of transgender people within the health care system, nor do they address coverage of
specific treatments that transgender people may need.
Id. at e34.  Even though the Obama administration has recently issued a proposed rule prohibit-
ing health care providers and insurers from discriminating against transgender individuals (see
Kimberly Leonard, Obama Defends Health Rights for Transgender Americans, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sep. 3, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/03/obamacare-ex
pands-rights-for-transgender-patients) health care benefits (and particularly coverage of gender
transition procedures) continue to vary widely for these individuals across states. See, e.g.,
Soumya Karlamangla, For Transgender People, Getting Healthcare Remains Difficult Despite
Obamacare, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/health/la-me-transgender-care-
20151004-story.html.
15. Accord Tara Murtha, The Problem with Obamacare for Some Trangender Policyholders,
RH REALITY CHECK (Mar. 12, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/03/12/problem-
obamacare-transgender-policyholders/ (discussing the systemic marginalization of transgender
individuals).
16. Although at least one transgender individual has successfully sued a hospital for gender
identity discrimination in violation of Section 1557 of the ACA (42 U.S.C. § 18116), the exis-
tence of the suit highlights inequitable care that still exists in some states for many transgender
individuals. See Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14–CV–2037, 2015 WL 1197415 (D.
Minn. Mar. 16, 2015); see also Murtha, supra note 15. R
17. See OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, SUMMARY OF OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM (OCC) AD-
VOCACY EFFORTS (June 2014), https://asmbs.org/wp/uploads/2014/06/Summary-of-OCC-EHB-
Advocacy-Efforts.pdf.
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spread lack of coverage has potential repercussions for a tremendous
number of individuals living in the United States.  Over one-third of
the U.S. population is obese, which means they have a body mass in-
dex (BMI)18 of thirty or higher.19  And, about one in six obese individ-
uals20 is considered morbidly obese, which means they have a BMI of
forty or higher.
Obese individuals living in one of the twenty-eight states that do not
presently mandate coverage for medical weight-loss treatment are
often confronted with an unsolvable financial conundrum as a result.21
If their doctor prescribes medical weight-loss treatment but their in-
surance plan only covers medical treatments mandated by the state
benchmark plan, then these obese individuals may be unable to afford
to pay out-of-pocket for the prescribed medical weight-loss treatment.
Yet, these individuals may simultaneously be unable to afford a more
comprehensive insurance plan that goes beyond the state-mandated
minimum requirements to cover weight-loss treatments.  The inability
to access prescribed medical weight-loss treatment can have repercus-
sions that go far beyond the effects on personal appearance.  Obesity
can contribute to the development of (or exacerbate already existing)
coronary heart disease, type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure, high cho-
lesterol, osteoarthritis, gynecological problems, sleep apnea, and other
respiratory problems.22
Of course, the ACA does not provide a right to all physician-pre-
scribed health care;23 it only provides a right to certain essential health
18. Throughout this Article, weight categories are defined according to BMI, which is calcu-
lated using the following equation: Using BMI, individuals are classified as underweight if their
BMI is less than 18.5, normal weight (if their BMI is greater than or equal to 18.5 but less than
25.0), overweight (if their BMI is greater than or equal to 25.0 but less than 30.0), obese (if their
BMI is greater than or equal to 30.0 but less than 40.0), or morbidly obese (if their BMI is
greater than or equal to 40.0).  Obesity: Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC (June 10, 2015), http://
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/obesity/basics/symptoms/con-20014834.
19. See Cynthia L. Ogden et al., Prevalence of Childhood and Adult Obesity in the United
States, 2011-2012, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 806, 806 (2014).
20. Morbidly obese individuals comprise approximately 6.6 % of the U.S. population. See R.
Sturm & A. Hattori, Morbid Obesity Rates Continue To Rise Rapidly in the United States, 37
INT’L J. OBESITY 889, 889 (2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3527647/pdf/
nihms-405266.pdf.
21. See OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, supra note 17. R
22. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NO. 98-4083, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICA-
TION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS: THE EVI-
DENCE REPORT 12–25 (Sept. 1998), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob_gdlns.pdf.
23. Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health: What Does This Mean for
Our Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457, 1464–65 (2001) (discussing the total lack of a right
to health care in the United States before the ACA in spite of international laws that recognize
health care as a human right); Alicia Ely Yamin, The Right to Health Under International Law
and Its Relevance to the United States, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1156, 1156–57 (2005); John
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benefits and a right to be free from discriminatory health care prac-
tices.  Thus, both states and insurance companies might argue that the
absence of universal medical weight-loss coverage is not an unfulfilled
promise of the ACA.  To support this argument, they might point to
the fact that weight-loss treatments are not specifically enumerated in
the Act as an essential health benefit and that the ACA’s nondiscrimi-
nation provision does not prohibit weight-based discrimination.
But such a narrow reading of the Act ignores the realities of what it
means to be obese and ignores other sweeping language within the
statute.  It ignores the fact that medical professionals—most notably
the American Medical Association, the National Institutes of Health,
and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention—consider obes-
ity a chronic disease, and chronic disease management is included on
the list of the ACA’s enumerated essential health benefits.24  It ig-
nores the fact that federal courts have held that obesity can be a disa-
bility, and the ACA explicitly bans disability discrimination in the
provision of health care benefits and services.25  Finally, it ignores the
fact that obesity has a well-documented disparate impact on women,
and the ACA bars sex discrimination.26
As demonstrated by the previously mentioned examples above,
many groups have been disappointed, thus far, by the seemingly broad
protections of the ACA.  The statutory language and federal case law
appear to support these individuals, yet residents of some states still
find themselves with insurance coverage that is discriminatory and
lacks needed essential health benefits.  This inequitable situation has
arisen because HHS, the federal agency in charge of interpreting the
ACA and issuing regulations, has yielded much of its authority to the
states.  Instead of drafting a uniform plan that enumerates, in detail,
the minimum essential health benefits and practices required for com-
pliance with the ACA, HHS has, instead, left this interpretation al-
most entirely to the states.  Each state defines its own benchmark plan
based on its own idea of what constitutes an essential health benefit
and what is discriminatory under the ACA.27  Sometimes states’ inter-
Geyman, Does the Affordable Care Act Guarantee Healthcare as a Right? HUFFINGTON POST,
(July 6, 2015, 7:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-geyman/does-the-affordable-
care_b_7740156.html (discussing the limitations of the ACA).
24. See infra notes 158–74 and accompanying text (discussing the characterization by “major
players in the field”).
25. See infra notes 186–232 (discussing the ban and decisions in various circuit courts). R
26. See infra notes 233–73 and accompanying text (discussing the history). R
27. In defining a state benchmark plan, some states default to the largest insurance product in
the small-group insurance market. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.100(c) (2013).  Nonetheless, the default
plan takes into account state regulatory requirements for insurance.
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pretations of the ACA are reasonable in light of the statutory lan-
guage and federal case law.  And sometimes they are not.  These
inconsistencies lead to the gaps in insurance coverage previously
described.28
To demonstrate the inequity of the current situation, this Article
considers, in detail, the case of obese individuals who are arguably the
largest group affected by the inconsistencies and coverage gaps that
result from allowing states to define their own benchmark plans in
accordance with the Act.  In Part II, the Article considers the rise in
U.S. obesity rates, the nature of obesity as a chronic disease, and the
importance of providing access to medical weight-loss treatments.29
Part III reveals the realities of access to weight-loss treatment both
before and after the implementation of the ACA.30  Parts IV, V, and
VI shift focus, demonstrating why the twenty-eight states that do not
cover medical weight-loss treatments in their benchmark plans are in
violation of the ACA.  Specifically, Part IV argues that medical
weight-loss treatment is an essential health benefit as defined by the
Act and, thus, should be guaranteed coverage.31  Part V explains why
failure to cover medical weight-loss treatment violates the ACA’s ban
on disability discrimination.32  Part VI explains why it also violates the
ACA’s ban on sex discrimination.33  Part VII concludes by recom-
mending that HHS draft a national benchmark plan to remedy the
inequities in insurance coverage that have arisen from allowing states
to define their own benchmark plans.34  Without a uniform standard
of coverage as defined by HHS, these coverage inequities will con-
tinue to impact not only obese individuals but also many other groups
of underserved individuals.
II. OBESITY IN AMERICA: THE EPIC RISE OF A CHRONIC DISEASE
In 2011, a British medical journal, The Lancet, referred to the rising
obesity rates across the world as a “pandemic.”35  In the United
States, the pandemic’s global epicenter, obesity rates have tripled over
the past two decades.  For example, in 1991, only 12% of the U.S.
population was obese, and, in 1990, no state had an obesity rate
28. See supra notes 9–22 and accompanying text. R
29. See infra notes 35–106 and accompanying text. R
30. See infra notes 107–47 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 148–74 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 175–232 and accompanying text. R
33. See infra notes 233–73 and accompanying text. R
34. See infra notes 274–86 and accompanying text. R
35. Editorial, Urgently Needed: A Framework Convention for Obesity Control, 378 LANCET
741, 741 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-4\DPL401.txt unknown Seq: 7 11-OCT-16 7:40
2016] UNFULFILLED PROMISES 1241
greater than 15%.36  By 1998, the nationwide obesity rate had dramat-
ically increased to 17.9%, and thirty-seven states had obesity rates
greater than 15%.37  Only two years later, in 2000, the statewide obes-
ity rates in twenty-three states exceeded 20%.  By 2010, all states had
an obesity rate greater than 20%, and twelve states had obesity rates
greater than 30%.38  According to the most recent data, one-third of
the U.S. adult population is obese, and the nationwide obesity rate
currently at 34.9%.39  Given these rapid increases in obesity rates, it is
not surprising that researchers commonly refer to this phenomenon as
the “obesity pandemic” or the “obesity epidemic.”40
Although the obesity epidemic has impacted all individuals living in
the United States, its effects have been particularly severe for certain
demographic groups.  For instance, Asian- and Caucasian-Americans
have below-average obesity rates, at 10.8% and 32.6%, respectively.
Compare these numbers to the numbers for minority groups, such as
Hispanic-Americans, whose current obesity rate is 42.5%, and, stun-
ningly, almost one-half of African-Americans (47.8%) living in the
United States are obese.41  Older individuals are more likely to be
obese than their younger counterparts; the current obesity rate for
U.S. adults over forty is 39.5% (compared to a 30.3% obesity rate for
adults under forty).42   Finally, the effects of the obesity epidemic are
also disproportionately felt by individuals of a lower socioeconomic
status.  Individuals with low-education and low-income levels have
above average obesity rates.43
Scientists and medical professionals generally agree that this precip-
itous rise in obesity rates over the past two decades has been detri-
mental to health in the United States.  Health researchers have linked
obesity to the development of functional limitations in performing
36. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, OBESITY TRENDS AMONG U.S. ADULTS
BETWEEN 1985 AND 2010 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/downloads/obesity_trends
_2010.pdf; Ali H. Mokdad et al., The Spread of the Obesity Epidemic in the United States, 1991-
1998, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1519, 1520 (1999) (noting that in 1991, 12% of the U.S. population
was obese and only four of the participating states had an obesity rate greater than 15%).
37. Mokdad, supra note 36, at 1520. R
38. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 36. R
39. Ogden et al., supra note 19, at 809. R
40. See, e.g., Nat’l Ctr. for Chronic Disease Prevention & Health Promotion, The Obesity
Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 22, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/
cdctv/diseaseandconditions/lifestyle/obesity-epidemic.html.
41. Ogden et al., supra note 19, at 811 tbl.4. R
42. Id. at 813 tbl.6.
43. Charles L. Baum II & Christopher J. Ruhm, Age, Socioeconomic Status and Obesity
Growth, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 635, 636 (2009); Charles L. Baum II & Shin-Yi Chou, The Socio-
Economic Causes of Obesity 16–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17423,
2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17423.
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physical tasks—such as standing up from a chair, climbing stairs, get-
ting into a car, running errands, dressing oneself, reaching for a five-
pound object, gripping objects, and doing light chores.44  Not only
does obesity increase an individual’s risk of developing musculoskele-
tal limitations, it also increases the risk of developing more serious
diseases.  It is widely known that obese individuals face an increased
risk of type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, high blood pressure,
and high cholesterol.45  It is less well known that obesity also increases
the risk of developing several types of cancer, including gastrointesti-
nal, endometrial, and breast cancers.46  Indeed, the health repercus-
sions of obesity are so dire, and the rates of obesity are so high, that a
2013 study attributed 18% of all deaths of U.S. adults between ages
forty and eighty-five to obesity.47
The medical and scientific communities may concur on the negative
effects of the obesity epidemic,48 but their opinions are less consonant
when it comes to the underlying causes of the epidemic.  Section A
briefly considers the varying theories for the underlying causes of the
obesity epidemic, which leads into Section B’s consideration of diet-
ing—or, more specifically, why traditional diets have not worked for
the majority of obese individuals.49   Section C then evaluates the effi-
cacy of common medical weight-loss treatment programs, demonstrat-
ing why the medical and scientific communities agree that medical
weight-loss treatments provide the most effective means for obese in-
dividuals to lose weight, to keep the weight off in the long run, and to
reduce the incidence of other medical conditions and complications
that arise from their obesity.50
44. See, e.g., Dawn E. Alley & Virginia W. Chang, The Changing Relationship of Obesity and
Disability, 1988–2004, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2020, 2021 (2007); Kenneth F. Ferraro et al., Body
Mass Index and Disability in Adulthood: A 20-Year Panel Study, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 834,
835 (2002); Andrea L. Hergenroeder et al., The Influence of Body Mass Index on Self-Report and
Performance-Based Measures of Physical Function in Adult Women, CARDIOPULMONARY PHYSI-
CAL THERAPY J., Sept. 2011, at 11, 13.
45. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, MANAGING OVERWEIGHT & OBESITY IN ADULTS: SYS-
TEMATIC EVIDENCE REVIEW FROM THE OBESITY EXPERT PANEL 1–4 (2013), http://
www.nhlbi.nih.gov/sites/www.nhlbi.nih.gov/files/obesity-evidence-review.pdf.
46. See Krishnan Bhaskaran et al., Body-Mass Index and Risk of 22 Specific Cancers: A Popu-
lation-Based Study of 5.24 Million UK Adults, 384 LANCET 755, 760–61 (2014).
47. Ryan K. Masters et al., The Impact of Obesity on US Mortality Levels: The Importance of
Age and Cohort Factors in Population Estimates, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1895, 1900 (2013).
48. See infra notes 51–66 and accompanying text (discussing theories of the driving forces R
behind obesity in the United States).
49. See infra notes 51–79 and accompanying text. R
50. See infra notes 80–106 and accompanying text. R
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A. War of Words: Theories Behind the Rise in U.S. Obesity Rates
From medicine to molecular biology, economics to epidemiology,
political science to psychology, obesity researchers currently span a
vast array of academic disciplines.  Perhaps it is not surprising then
that these researchers have developed a myriad of theories to explain
the rapid increase in obesity rates, given their vastly different research
approaches.  Popular theories among academics rely on the underly-
ing, widely accepted assumption that weight is solely determined by
balancing caloric intake with calorie expenditure.51
Calorie expenditure theories often emphasize the increase in seden-
tary behavior among U.S. adults, due to the rise of desk jobs,52 in-
creased commuting times,53 and a shift toward less active leisure
activities.54  Other theories focus on changes in caloric intake rather
than calories expended.  The most popular theories center on changes
in food prices, claiming that U.S. residents have increased their caloric
intake over the last few decades55 due to the relative decrease in the
price of all food56 or due to the relative increase in the price of healthy
food.57  More provocative theories point to the decreased presence of
women in the home, leading to the decline of home cooking and fam-
ily meals.58
51. Accord Mayo Clinic Staff, Counting Calories: Get Back to Weight-Loss Basics, MAYO
CLINIC (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/weight-loss/in-depth/calories/
art-20048065 (advising readers that “weight management still comes down to the calories you
take in versus those you burn off”).
52. See, e.g., Timothy S. Church et al., Trends over 5 Decades in U.S. Occupation-Related
Physical Activity and Their Associations with Obesity, PLOS ONE, May 25, 2011, at 1, 4, http://
journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0019657.
53. See, e.g., Christine M. Hoehner et al., Commuting Distance, Cardiorespiratory Fitness, and
Metabolic Risk, 42 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 571, 574 (2012).
54. Accord Barbara A. Dennison et al., Television Viewing and Television in Bedroom Associ-
ated with Overweight Risk Among Low-Income Preschool Children, 109 PEDIATRICS 1028,
1032–34 (2002).
55. Recent evidence suggests that individuals living in the United States are beginning to de-
crease their caloric consumption for the first time in decades. See Margot Sanger-Katz, Behind a
Drop in Calories, A Shift in Cultural Attitudes, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2015, at A3.
56. See Sturm & Hattori, supra note 20, at 342–44. R
57. See, e.g., Pablo Monsivais & Adam Drewnowski, The Rising Cost of Low-Energy-Density
Foods, 107 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 2071, 2073–75 (2007); Pablo Monsivais & Adam Drewnowski,
Lower-Energy-Density Diets Are Associated with Higher Monetary Costs per Kilocalorie and Are
Consumed by Women of Higher Socioeconomic Status, 109 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 814, 818
(2009); Mayuree Rao et al., Do Healthier Foods and Diet Patterns Cost More than Less Healthy
Options? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, BMJ OPEN, Dec. 2013, at 1, 10–12, http://
bmjopen.bmj.com/content/3/12/e004277.full?sid=F40b344f-ef24-4a2d-9c09-59516f35fefc.
58. Accord MARY EBERSTADT, HOME-ALONE AMERICA: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF DAY CARE,
BEHAVIORAL DRUGS, AND OTHER PARENT SUBSTITUTES 39–40 (2004).
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Hypotheses to explain the obesity epidemic have arisen outside of
academia as well, often tracing their origins to journalists and bestsel-
ling books from the popular press.  For example, a New York Times
food columnist, Mark Bittman, has led a very public crusade against
processed food and big food companies, blaming them for the coun-
try’s weight woes.59  Other authors have traced the United States’
weight problems to the rise of specifically added ingredients in the
U.S. food supply: William R. Davis’s Wheat Belly,60 Joseph Mercola’s
Sweet Deception (artificial sweeteners),61 Michael Moss’s Salt Sugar
Fat,62 and Michael Pollman’s The Omnivore’s Dilemma (corn)63 all
immediately come to mind.  Some of these popular theories have
gained traction in the academic world,64 whereas others have not.65
In sum, researchers have identifed many potential contributors to
the sharp rise in obesity rates over the last few decades, but they have
not yet been able to tease out their relative importance.  Perhaps one
obesity researcher described the academic consensus best, noting:
“There is no one single factor [that causes obesity], but the deck is
stacked toward excessive weight gain in our society with the access to
high calorie food and engaging sedentary activities in every direction
. . . .”66  Regardless of their preferred theory behind the rise in obesity
rates, researchers all seem to be pointing their fingers to outside fac-
tors beyond the control of obese individuals, such as changes in envi-
59. See Mark Bittman, Opinion, Let’s Make Food Issues Real, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/opinion/lets-make-food-issues-real.html; Mark Bittman, Parasites,
Killing Their Host, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2014, at A27; Mark Bittman, What Causes Weight Gain,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2014, at A23.
60. WILLIAM DAVIS, WHEAT BELLY: LOSE THE WHEAT, LOSE THE WEIGHT, AND FIND YOUR
PATH BACK TO HEALTH 55–60 (2011).
61. JOSEPH MERCOLA, SWEET DECEPTION: WHY SPLENDA®, NUTRASWEET®, AND THE FDA
MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH 14–17 (2006).
62. MICHAEL MOSS, SALT SUGAR FAT: HOW THE FOOD GIANTS HOOKED US 267–71 (2013).
63. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS
100–08 (2006).
64. See, e.g., Adam Drewnowski, The Real Contribution of Added Sugars and Fats to Obesity,
29 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REV. 160 (2007); Joseph Suez et al., Artificial Sweeteners Induce Glucose
Intolerance by Altering the Gut Microbiota, 514 NATURE 181 (2014).
65. See, e.g., Jessica R. Biesiekierski et al., No Effects of Gluten in Patients with Self-Reported
Non-Celiac Gluten Sensitivity After Dietary Reduction of Fermentable, Poorly Absorbed, Short-
Chain Carbohydrates, 145 GASTROENTEROLOGY 320 (2013) (finding no positive effects of a glu-
ten-free diet when other known digestive irritants are removed from the diet); Pablo Monsivais
et al., Sugars and Satiety: Does the Type of Sweetener Make a Difference? 86 AM. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 116 (2007) (finding no difference in satiety or consumption outcomes when high-
fructose corn syrup is consumed versus sugar).
66. Marjorie Connelly, More Children Are Obese, and More Americans Know It, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/13/health/more-children-are-obese-and-more-
americans-know-it.html (quoting Dr. Nancy F. Krebs, Chairwoman, American Academy of Pe-
diatrics’ Committee on Nutrition).
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ronment, business practices, lifestyle, and food supply—they do not
seem to be placing much blame on obese individuals for gaining
weight.
B. The Diet Myth
Although researchers have been careful not to assign all blame for
the obesity epidemic on obese individuals themselves, U.S. public
opinion is not so forgiving.  For example, a 2005 U.S. survey found
that 65% of U.S. residents believed that obese people lacked personal
willpower, and 62% of respondents thought that obesity was solely the
result of an individual’s choice to consume unhealthy food.67  And,
even as obesity becomes more common—affecting an increasingly
large percentage of the population—the individual blame appears to
be getting stronger.  A 2013 U.S. survey asked respondents to catego-
rize food manufacturers, grocery stores, restaurants, government poli-
cies, farmers, individuals, and parents as primarily responsible,
somewhat responsible, or not responsible for the obesity epidemic.
Eighty percent of respondents blamed individuals as primarily respon-
sible for the nationwide rise in obesity rates; 59% of the respondents
also primarily blamed parents.68  In contrast, only one-half of respon-
dents ascribed any blame to government policies, and less than one-
half placed any blame on farmers or grocery stores.69
Popular opinion’s assignment of most (if not all) blame on individu-
als unsurprisingly translates into the popular belief that if an obese
person wants to lose weight, the remedy is simple: eat less and exer-
cise more.  Yet, obesity researchers increasingly agree that the “prob-
lem is not really so simple and uncomplicated as it is pictured.”70  A
2014 article in the Journal of the American Medical Association sum-
marized the research indicating that “[a]ttempts to lower body weight
without addressing the biological drivers of weight gain, including the
quality of the diet, will inevitably fail for most individuals.”71  Indeed,
approximately 90–95% of individuals who successfully lose weight on
67. J. Eric Oliver & Taeku Lee, Public Opinion and the Politics of Obesity in America, 30 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 923, 933 (2005).
68. Jayson L. Lusk & Brenna Ellison, Who Is To Blame for the Rise in Obesity?, 68 APPETITE
14, 17, 18 fig.2 (2013).
69. For comparison, 35% of U.S. residents classified food manufacturers as primarily to blame
for the obesity epidemic and only 20% classified restaurants as primarily to blame. Id.
70. David S. Ludwig & Mark I. Friedman, Increasing Adiposity: Consequence or Cause of
Overeating, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2167, 2167 (2014) (quoting What Causes Obesity?, 83 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1003, 1003 (1924)); accord Gary Taubes, The Science of Obesity: What Do We Re-
ally Know About What Makes Us Fat?, BMY, Apr. 16, 2013, at 1.
71. Ludwig & Friedman, supra note 70, at 2167. R
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a diet will regain the weight within several years.72  Even the Hand-
book of Obesity, a research guide written by leading scientists and
practitioners, intended to provide “up-to-date coverage of the range
of subjects that make up the field of obesity research[,]”73 famously
concluded that the long-run results of traditional diets that encourage
restricting calories and increasing exercise are “poor and not long-
lasting.”74
Researchers generally agree that whatever is impeding the long-run
success of diets is likely biological in origin, although the exact mecha-
nism remains a source of debate.  Some researchers emphasize the
nutritional content of most food consumed in the United States, hy-
pothesizing that its nature leads to the buildup of fat within the human
body.75  Many researchers, however, ascribe to a version of the set-
point theory.  First advanced by psychologist Richard Nisbett in 1972,
this theory emphasizes that every individual has a natural weight, or
set point, toward which they gravitate.76  Thus, even if an individual
successfully loses weight in the short run, in the long run, the individ-
ual will naturally return to her set point.  The theory has been further
bolstered by endocrinology research, which has identified neurologi-
cal pathways that lead individuals to return to their initial weight re-
gardless of whether their initial weight was above or below normal.77
Still, because a few decades is too short of a time period for any
kind of evolutionary change in people’s set points, some biologists
have explained the obesity epidemic with an addendum to the set-
point theory.  Instead of natural weight being completely predeter-
mined, many biologists now believe that natural weight is determined
72. Susan C. Wooley & David M. Garner, Controversies in Management: Dietary Treatments
for Obesity Are Ineffective, 309 BMJ 655, 655 (1994).
73. LUDWIG & FRIEDMAN, HANDBOOK OF OBESITY, at iii (George A. Bray et al. eds., 1998).
74. See Luc F. Van Gaal, Dietary Treatment of Obesity, in HANDBOOK OF OBESITY, supra note
73, at 875, 876 (“Losing weight is relatively easy, but the maintenance of weight loss may be R
more distressing . . . .”).
75. See, e.g., Ludwig & Friedman, supra note 70; Taubes, supra note 70, at 3. R
76. Richard E. Nisbett, Hunger, Obesity, and the Ventromedial Hypothalamus, 79 PSYCHOL.
REV. 433, 435 (1972).  See, for example, Rudolph L. Leibel et al., Changes in Energy Expendi-
ture Resulting from Altered Body Weight, 332 N. ENG. J. MED. 621, 627 (1995); James A. Levine
et al., Non-Exercise Activity Thermogenesis: The Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon of Societal
Weight Gain, 26 ARTERIOSCLER. THROMB. & VAS. BIOL. 729, 732–35 (2006); and E. A. H. Sims
et al., Endocrine and Metabolic Effects of Experimental Obesity in Man, 29 RECENT PROGRESS
HORMONE RES. 457, 463–65 (1973), for more recent laboratory experiments supporting the exis-
tence of a biological set point.
77. Roger D. Cone, one leading researcher in this area, identified neurological pathways that
contribute to energy homeostasis—in this case, the return to original weight. See Roger D.
Cone, The Central Melanocortin System and Energy Homeostasis, 10 TRENDS ENDOCRIN. & ME-
TABOLISM 211, 214–15 (1999).
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by the interaction between genes and the environment. Genes deter-
mine a person’s predisposition toward being heavy; environment de-
termines just how heavy the person becomes.78  As one literature
review noted: “Genes do not necessarily make people fat[,] but they
do make certain people more predisposed to being heavy if environ-
mental conditions are correct.”79
In general, the scientific and medical research is quite pessimistic
regarding the ability of obese individuals to achieve long-term weight
loss through traditional dieting methods.  Certainly, examples exist of
obese individuals who have been able to lose weight and successfully
maintain the weight loss without much, or any, rebound.  But, the ex-
amples are rare. For most obese individuals, another form of treat-
ment is required to achieve sustained, meaningful weight loss.  The
most popular alternative forms of treatment—and, indeed, the only
other existing forms of weight-loss treatment that have been proven
effective by scientific studies—are medical in nature and administered
under the care of a physician.  The next Section examines both the
nature and the comparative efficacy of these medical weight-loss
treatments.
C. Medical Weight-Loss Treatment Alternatives
Physicians currently prescribe two types of weight-loss treatments
to obese patients: weight-loss pharmaceuticals and weight-loss sur-
gery.  This Section separately considers each method of treatment and
compares their methodologies, benefits, risks, efficacies, and costs.
Unlike traditional diets, the scientific studies are much more optimis-
tic regarding the ability of obese patients to achieve long-term weight
loss using these medical weight-loss options.  The increased efficacy,
however, comes at a cost, making these treatments out of reach for
many individuals whose insurance plans refuse to cover them.
1. Pharmaceutical Treatments
The first option for obese individuals seeking weight-loss treatment
from a physician is taking a pill.  Currently, five prescription weight-
loss pills have Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval in the
United States: orlistat, lorcaserin, phentermine-topiramate, naltrex-
78. See ROBERT POOL, FAT: FIGHTING THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC 153–55, 167–68 (2001) and
ELLEN RUPPEL SHELL, THE HUNGRY GENE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE OBESITY INDUSTRY
170–172 (2002), for reviews of this literature.
79. J. ERIC OLIVER, FAT POLITICS: THE REAL STORY BEHIND AMERICA’S OBESITY EPIDEMIC
104 (2006).
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one-bupropion, and liraglutide.80  Orlistat prevents fat absorption into
the body, while the other four drugs target neurological processes that
suppress appetite.81
None of these pills are so-called magic pills; patients on these medi-
cations cannot eat whatever they want while being completely inactive
and still expect to lose weight.  Instead, physicians view the pills as “an
adjunct to comprehensive lifestyle management”82—allowing patients
who make the commitment to decrease their food intake and increase
their activity levels to lose weight in the long-run.  The pills also come
with adverse side effects.  In addition to blocking fat from absorbing
into the body, orlistat can prevent good nutrients, such as fat-soluble
vitamins, from absorbing.83  All of the medications are (perhaps not
surprisingly) associated with negative gastrointestinal symptoms.
And, none of the medications are safe for pregnant women.84
Current medical guidelines recommend pharmacotherapy for three
categories of patients: (1) obese patients (i.e., patients with a
BMI = 30); (2) overweight patients with a BMI = 27 and an obesity-
related complication, such as type 2 diabetes or sleep apnea; and (3)
overweight patients who have been unable to achieve long-term
weight loss through lifestyle management alone.85  For these patients,
the effects of weight-loss drugs are long-term, albeit modest.  The
drugs are associated with a mean weight loss between four and ten
kilograms (approximately nine to twenty-two pounds).86  This weight
loss is meaningful for patients with BMIs in the high twenties and low
thirties for whom twenty pounds can make the difference between be-
ing obese and overweight or overweight and normal weight.  This
weight loss can also make a meaningful difference in the development
and treatment of related conditions, such as type 2 diabetes.87  Losing
twenty pounds is less significant.
Yet given the high costs in the absence of insurance coverage, even
the best candidates for pharmaceutical weight-loss treatment may be
unable to access this treatment.  Orlistat, for example, costs between
80. Caroline M. Apovian et al., Challenging Obesity: Patient, Provider, and Expert Perspec-
tives on the Roles of Available and Emerging Nonsurgical Therapies, 23 OBESITY S1, S12 (Supp.
2015).  However, there are other drugs with the primary purpose of treating another condition
(e.g., diabetes) but also can induce a secondary weight-loss effect.
81. See id. at S14.
82. Id. at S12.
83. Id. at S14.
84. Id. at S15 tbl.7, S16 tbl.8.
85. Id. at S12.
86. See George A. Bray & Donna H. Ryan, Update on Obesity Pharmacotherapy, 1311 AN-
NALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 2–7 (2014).
87. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 45, at 18–19. R
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$5.50 and $6.00 per pill—meaning that a 30-day supply will cost a pa-
tient without insurance coverage over $150 every month.  Similarly,
one dose of phentermine-topiramate costs approximately $7.00, run-
ning a noncovered patient $200 every month.88  Moreover, these
drugs, are intended for long-term use, so even if $200 is occasionally
feasible for a patient, $2,400 a year in drug expenses may be cost pro-
hibitive.  Concerns regarding treatment costs become particularly sali-
ent given the composition of the patient population.  Recall from the
introduction to Part I that obesity disproportionately affects individu-
als with low income, individuals with low education, and individuals
who identify as a minority.89
2. Surgical Treatments
The second, undoubtedly more drastic, option for obese individuals
seeking weight-loss treatment from a physician is surgery. Known as
bariatric surgery, several methods of bariatric surgery are currently
practiced in the United States to help patients lose weight.  These
methods include gastric band surgery, gastric bypass surgery, vertical
sleeve gastrectomy, and (less commonly) biliopancreatic diversion
with a duodenal switch.90  Gastric band surgery inserts a saline-filled
band around the upper stomach, which reduces the opening for future
food intake.91  A vertical sleeve gastrectomy removes 85% of the
stomach to limit future food intake.92  Gastric bypass surgery, the
most common type of bariatric surgery,93 even more drastically
reduces the size of the stomach and reroutes its exit to the middle of
the small intestine to limit the future absorption of calories.94  Duode-
nal switch surgery is similar to gastric bypass surgery, although it in-
volves more complex intestinal rerouting, which even more severely
restricts the future absorption of calories.95
88. Drug price estimates come from drugs.com and are accurate as of March 30, 2016.  Orlis-
tat, commonly sold under the label Xenical, costs $166.55 for thirty capsules.  Phentermine-
topiramate, commonly sold under the label Qsymia, costs between $196.61 and $217.22 for thirty
capsules (depending on the dosage).
89. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
90. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L  INST. OF DIABETES & DIGESTIVE &
KIDNEY DISEASES, NO. 08-4006, BARIATRIC SURGERY FOR SEVERE OBESITY (June 2011) [here-
inafter NIH BARIATIC SURGERY], http://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/health-topics/
weight-control/bariatric-surgery-severe-obesity/Documents/Bariatric_Surgery_508.pdf.
91. See AM. SOC’Y FOR METABOLIC & BARIATRIC SURGERY, METABOLIC AND BARIATRIC
SURGERY 2 (2013), http://asmbs.org/wp/uploads/2014/05/Metabolic+Bariatric-Surgery.pdf.
92. Id.
93. Approximately 80% of bariatric surgery patients have a gastric bypass. See Ted D. Adams
et al., Long-Term Mortality After Gastric Bypass Surgery, 357 N. ENG. J. MED. 753, 754 (2007).
94. See AM. SOC’Y FOR METABOLIC & BARIATRIC SURGERY, supra note 91, at 2. R
95. See NIH BARIATIC SURGERY, supra note 90, at 4. R
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Although bariatric surgery is not a magic cure for obesity, it may be
closer than pills.  To succeed, patients must commit to decreasing their
food intake over the long run; these surgeries simply make that com-
mitment easier.  Predictably, the potential negative side effects are
also more grave than the side effects of pharmacotherapy or dieting.
Complications, such as infections, may occur after any bariatric sur-
gery, although the complication rate is only 4.3%.96  Other long-term
health effects include problems with malabsorption and development
of hernias,97 but, again, the overall patient mortality rate remains at
0.1%.98
Current medical guidelines recommend bariatric surgery only for:
(1) morbidly obese patients (i.e., individuals with a BMI = 40) and (2)
obese patients with an obesity-related complication and a BMI = 35.99
For these patients, the overall efficacy is remarkable, particularly
when compared to the null effects produced by dieting and the small
effects produced by pharmacotherapy.  Within the first year after sur-
gery, an average gastric bypass patient will lose more than 75% of her
excess body weight and will generally maintain at least two-thirds of
the surgery-induced weight loss in the long run.100  Compared to
obese patients who use weight-loss drugs, bariatric surgery patients
lose, an average, forty-six to sixty-eight pounds more weight.101
Bariatric surgery also has pronounced, positive effects the patients’
weight-related conditions and mortality.  Over three-quarters of pa-
tients see their diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol, and sleep ap-
nea either improve or completely dissipate after surgery.102  And,
these effects add up—according to a 2007 New England Journal of
Medicine study, morbidly obese individuals who had undergone a gas-
tric bypass had a 40% lower mortality rate than similar individuals
96. See AM. SOC’Y FOR METABOLIC & BARIATRIC SURGERY, supra note 91, at 1 (citing Longi- R
tudinal Assessment of Bariatric Surgery (LABS) Consortium, Perioperative Safety in the Longi-
tudinal Assessment of Bariatric Surgery, 361 N. ENG. J. MED. 445, 450 (2009)).
97. See NIH BARIATIC SURGERY, supra note 90, at 4–5. R
98. See AM. SOC’Y FOR METABOLIC & BARIATRIC SURGERY, supra note 91, at 1 (citing Yafu R
Zhao, M.S. & William Encinosa, Ph.D., Bariatric Surgery Utilization and Outcomes in 1998 and
2004, Statistical Brief #23, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (AHRQ) (Jan. 2007),
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb23.jsp.
99. Note that gastric band surgery is only FDA-approved for obese patients with an obesity-
related complication and a BMI ≥ 35. See NIH BARIATIC SURGERY, supra note 90, at 1. R
100. See Alan C. Wittgrove & G. Wesley Clark, Laparoscopic Gastric Bypass, Roux-En-Y—
500 Patients: Technique and Results, with 3-60 Month Follow-up, 10 OBESITY SURGERY 233, 235
fig.2, tbl.1 (2000).
101. See AM. SOC’Y FOR METABOLIC & BARIATRIC SURGERY, supra note 91, at 1. R
102. See Viktoria L. Gloy et al., Bariatric Surgery Versus Non-Surgical Treatment for Obesity:
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Randomised Controlled Trials, 347 BMJ (2014), http:/
/www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f5934.
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who had not undergone the bypass.  The overall mortality rate reduc-
tion was largely driven by postoperative declines in the incidence and
severity of type 2 diabetes, coronary artery disease, and cancer.103
The medical research consistently indicates that bariatric surgery
can meaningfully improve both the quality and the duration of mor-
bidly obese individuals’ lives.  It is not a miracle, yet it offers the possi-
bility of significant, sustainable weight loss and improvement in
obesity-related conditions that even weight-loss pharmaceuticals can-
not rival.  Still, as much as costs impede access to pharmaceutical
weight-loss treatment, costs impose an even greater barrier to weight-
loss surgery.  Few Americans can afford bariatric surgery in the ab-
sence of insurance coverage.  According to the American Society of
Metabolic and Bariatric Surgery (ASMBS), the procedures costs be-
tween $11,500 and $26,000104—the price of a new car.  Moreover,
given that morbidly obese individuals are, on the whole, of a lower-
income patient population, these extraordinary costs make the proce-
dure out of reach for many individuals who desire the treatment.105
The strong empirical evidence that bariatric surgery and weight-loss
pharmaceuticals can improve health outcomes for obese patients in a
way that dieting cannot—juxtaposed with other, arguably less signifi-
cant treatments that insurance plans normally cover (the drug Viagra
immediately comes to mind)—raises the question: Why do some in-
surance plans not cover these medical weight-loss treatments?  Even
though the cost of surgery is tremendous, research studies indicate
that insurers will recoup their cost outlays within two to four years,
due to the reduction in health care costs associated with weight loss.106
Even though two to four years seem like a relatively short waiting
period to recoup costs, from an insurance company’s perspective, it is
worrisomely long.  Because insurance contracts are annually renewed,
insurance companies are concerned that covered individuals will
change providers within this two-to-four-year period after surgery.
(Covered individuals may not change by choice.  For instance, so
many U.S. employees receive their health insurance through their em-
ployer, their employer may elect to change insurance providers
shortly after surgery).  Thus, insurers are concerned that their com-
103. See Adams et al., supra note 93, at 756. R
104. See AM. SOC’Y FOR METABOLIC & BARIATRIC SURGERY, supra note 91, at 3; see also R
Leon Salem et al., Are Bariatric Surgical Outcomes Worth Their Cost? A Systematic Review, 200
J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 270, 271 (2005) (estimating the cost effectiveness of surgery).
105. See supra notes 41–43.
106. Pierre-Yves Cre´mieux et al., A Study on the Economic Impact of Bariatric Surgery, 14
AM. J. MANAGED CARE 589, 589, 592, 594 (2008).
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pany will pay for the surgery, but another insurance company will
reap all of the benefits.
In many ways, the coverage issue presents a common collective ac-
tion problem in which all insurance providers would be better off in
the long run if they all covered bariatric surgery, but they might be
harmed if some insurers decide to shirk and decline to provide cover-
age.  This reasoning provided a sufficient justification for the insur-
ance companies to decline covering medical weight-loss treatments—
that is, until the passage of the ACA changed the rules.
III. HEALTH INSURANCE ROADBLOCKS TO WEIGHT-LOSS
TREATMENT
Part II of this Article explored both why obesity rates have risen
over the last few decades and why physicians recommend medical
weight-loss treatments to so many of their obese patients.107  This Part
shifts focus, examining why so many obese individuals who wish to
comply with their physicians’ recommendations are unable to access
the necessary care in spite of presently applicable federal statutory
protections.108
The precise number of obese individuals who wish to receive medi-
cal weight-loss treatment but are unable to receive the treatment due
to cost constraints is unknown.  But, the numbers that are known are
quite telling.  According to the ASMBS, approximately 18 million pa-
tients in the United States are currently eligible for bariatric surgery.
Yet, only 160,000 patients underwent the procedure in 2013.109  More-
over, the annual number of patients undergoing bariatric surgery has
remained very similar over the past decade despite the fact that obes-
ity rates (and, thus, the eligible patient population) have continued to
rise.110
Anecdotal evidence tells the story behind these numbers.  Physi-
cians recount numerous stories of patients who desired medical
weight-loss treatment but could not afford it.  Indeed, the problem is
so widespread that the Associated Press posted an article in 2014 pro-
claiming: “Few eligible patients can get weight-loss surgery.”111  The
problem is that weight-loss treatment coverage has traditionally re-
107. See supra notes 35–106 and accompanying text. R
108. See infra notes 109–47 and accompanying text. R
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quired the purchase of a special insurance rider—it has not been part
of a standard insurance policy.112  Of course, most health insurance is
purchased by employers not individuals,113 and nearly two-thirds of
employers elect not to spend the money on the additional coverage.114
Compounding the pervasive lack of insurance coverage is the fact
that the procedure can still be cost-prohibitive for the few individuals
who are covered.  Insurance riders often only pay for 50% of the cost
of weight-loss treatment, so even after help from insurance, bariatric
surgery patients may, nonetheless, be stuck with a $10,000 bill.115  Fi-
nally, denials of coverage are frequent.  Before covering weight-loss
treatments, insurance companies require much more extensive docu-
mentation than mere proof that an individual is obese.  Common re-
quirements include: documentation of obesity for a five-year period, a
year of psychological counseling, a year of supervised dieting, and
proof of prior, failed attempts to lose weight without medical treat-
ment.116  Insurance companies are notoriously strict with these re-
quirements because many patients will give up due to frustration and
the inability to complete the necessary requirements.  According to
one bariatric surgeon, the number of doctor’s appointments needed to
qualify for insurance coverage of bariatric surgery leads “[h]alf of the
people I see [to] drop out because they can’t commit to time away
from their jobs.”117
Historically, obese employees who desired medical weight-loss
treatment but were barred from accessing this treatment due to cost
did not have any legal recourse.  Currently in the United States, there
is no federally mandated right to all physician-prescribed health
care.118  In fact, prior to the ACA, the only people who had a right to
health care, regardless of their ability to pay, were patients requiring
emergency care.  The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active La-
112. See PAM DAVIS, WHAT TO DO WHEN YOU’RE DENIED (BARIATRIC)WEIGHT-LOSS SUR-
GERY, http://www.obesityaction.org/wp-content/uploads/Bariatric-Surgery-Denial.pdf.
113. See Number of Americans Obtaining Health Insurance Through an Employer Declines
Steadily Since 2000, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.rwjf.org/en/
library/articles-and-news/2013/04/number-of-americans-obtaining-health-insurance-through-an-
employ.html.  Certainly, the importance of employer-provided health plans may diminish in the
post-ACA regime.
114. See Associated Press, supra note 109. R
115. See id.
116. See DAVIS, supra note 112, at 3; Associated Press, supra note 109. R
117. See Associated Press, supra note 109 (quoting Dr. Carson Liu, bariatric surgeon). R
118. See Geyman, supra note 23. But see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism R
and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1388–89 (2011) (arguing that the ACA
“recognizes a fundamental right to health care in the United States” but acknowledging that
there are weaknesses in the argument).
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bor Act119 requires all hospitals that accept Medicare to determine
whether individuals presenting themselves for emergency treatment
actually require said treatments, and, if so, to provide these individu-
als with sufficient treatment to stabilize their condition.120  The federal
government also provides extensive health insurance benefits to the
poor,121 elderly,122 and veterans,123 but even these programs do not
guarantee a right to all physician-prescribed health care.  With the ex-
ception of these limited carve-outs, health care guarantees have been
virtually nonexistent in the United States—until the implementation
of the ACA.
Although the ACA does not establish a right to all physician-pre-
scribed health care, it professes to make substantial progress toward
this goal.  Two key provisions of the ACA are critical to this progres-
sion.  First, the ACA’s nondiscrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 18116,
guarantees the following:
an individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, or section 794 of title
29, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activ-
ity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .
The enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under
such title VI, title IX, section 794, or such Age Discrimination Act
shall apply for purposes of violations of this subsection.124
In simpler terms, the ACA’s nondiscrimination provision prohibits
discrimination in health care provisions and health care coverage on
the basis of race, color, or national origin (prohibited by Title VI), sex
(prohibited by Title IX), age, or disability (prohibited by the Rehabili-
tation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794).  By its plain language, the prohibition
extends to essentially all entities in the health care domain because it
would be difficult to find a health care provider, hospital, insurer, or
insurance exchange that does not receive federal funds.  Nonetheless,
the provision recognizes that the realities of implementation might re-
quire the HHS Secretary to issue regulations.125
119. See Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121, 100 Stat. 164, 164–67 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (2012)).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
121. Id. § 1396(b)(2)(B).
122. See id. § 1395.
123. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1701–54 (2012).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (citations omitted).
125. Id. § 18116(c).
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Second, the ACA requires health insurance plans to provide, at a
minimum, an “essential health benefits package.”126  Section
18022(b)(1) mandates that the essential package contain:
(A) Ambulatory patient services.
(B) Emergency services.
(C) Hospitalization.
(D) Maternity and newborn care.
(E) Mental health and substance use disorder services,
including behavioral health treatment.
(F) Prescription drugs.
(G) Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices.
(H) Laboratory services.
(I) Preventative and wellness services and chronic disease
management.
(J) Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.127
The statute defers to (and, indeed, requires) the HHS Secretary to
precisely define what treatments fall within the scope of these ten cat-
egories; however, the statute does offer the Secretary interpretive gui-
dance in 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4).  Among its directives are
requirements that the Secretary “not make coverage decisions, deter-
mine reimbursement rates, establish incentive programs, or design
benefits in ways that discriminate against individuals because of their
age, disability, or expected length of life”128 and “take into account
the health care needs of diverse segments of the population, including
women, children, persons with disabilities, and other groups.”129
In the face of these directives, the obvious course of action for HHS
would have been to devise its own list of treatments that would be
required for insurance plans to comply with the ACA.  Instead, HHS
punted; rather than exercise its direct authority to determine what
kinds of treatments and health care practices were essential and non-
discriminatory, HHS yielded its authority to the states.  In its final reg-
ulations, HHS merely restates the ten categories of essential health
benefits without elaboration.130  It then directed the individual states
to select a “base-benchmark plan”—a plan that, in the state’s opinion,
meets the essential health benefit and nondiscrimination require-
126. Id. § 18021(a)(1)(B).
127. Id. § 18022(b)(1).
128. Id. § 18022(b)(4)(B).
129. Id. § 18022(b)(4)(C).
130. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.110(a) (2014).
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ments.131  Once selected, this plan sets the minimum requirements for
plans offered through the state insurance health exchanges.  The state
benchmark also becomes the guidepost for other insurance plans of-
fered throughout the state, even for those not offered through the in-
surance health exchange.132
The practical results of HHS’s punting its authority to the states are
inconsistency and uncertainty.  Conditions considered to be an essen-
tial health benefit in one state may not be covered in the state next
door.  Although some regional trends are apparent (Southern states,
for example, have been noticeably stingy in their determination of es-
sential health benefits), the inconsistencies are not always regional in
nature.133  Figure 1, which compares the state-by-state determination
of whether medical weight-loss treatment constitutes an essential
heath benefit under the ACA, illustrates this point.
FIGURE 1. COVERAGE OF MEDICAL WEIGHT LOSS TREATMENTS IN
STATE BENCHMARK PLANS134
131. Id. § 156.100.  If a state fails to select a base-benchmark plan, the default benchmark plan
is the largest plan in the small-group insurance market, which takes into account state regulatory
requirements regarding mandatory coverage of specific health conditions. See id. § 156.100(c).
132. See id. §§ 156.100–.110.
133. See OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, supra note 17. R
134. This figure was originally developed by the Obesity Care Continuum for its 2014 report.
See id.
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Figure 1 demonstrates that in some areas of the country, moving
over the border can make a tremendous difference in access to
weight-loss treatments.  For instance, Chicago-area residents who
choose to live in a Northwest Indiana suburb are far more likely to
face access problems to medical weight-loss treatment than are re-
sidents who live in Illinois.  The Illinois state benchmark plan covers
bariatric surgery, which means that insured individuals throughout the
state enjoy this coverage as a core benefit.135  In contrast, the Indiana
benchmark plan, covers nothing related to weight loss.136  The state-
by-state discrepancies are even more pronounced in the Washington
D.C. metropolitan area.  Residents of D.C. enjoy coverage of
nonsurgical weight-loss programs as a core benefit,137 but residents of
Maryland are only covered for surgical weight-loss programs.138  Re-
sidents of Virginia, on the other hand, are not covered for any medical
weight-loss treatments through the state benchmark plan.139
The state-by-state determinations regarding medical weight-loss
treatments necessarily related to the proportion of the state’s popula-
tion that is obese.  True, medical weight-loss treatments are generally
not part of the state benchmark plans in the southern states, which is
the region where obesity rates are highest.140  At first glance, this pat-
tern may lead observers to suspect that states may be interpreting the
meaning of an essential health benefit (at least with respect to medical
weight-loss treatment) purely based on cost concerns.141  Yet many
states with an obesity rate over 30% cover at least one form of medi-
cal weight-loss treatment in their benchmark plans—including Dela-
ware, Iowa, Michigan, North Dakota, and West Virginia.142  In fact,
135. The only insured individuals who will not be covered for bariatric surgery are those who
qualify for and have elected to purchase catastrophic coverage. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDI-
CAID SERS., ILLINOIS EHB BENCHMARK PLAN,  https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-
Resources/Downloads/illinois-ehb-benchmark-plan.pdf.  Only individuals under age thirty and
individuals with a “hardship exemption” (usually related to the inability to pay) are eligible for
catastrophic coverage. See Catastrophic Health Plans, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obama-
carefacts.com/health-insurance/catastrophic-plans/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).




140. See generally OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, supra note 17 (showing availability of sur- R
gery); Data, Trends and Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://
www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/prevalence-maps.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2016) (depicting self-re-
ported obesity).
141. States with high obesity rates might be concerned about the costliness of covering
weight-loss treatment in the benchmark plan when such a large percentage of their population is
already obese.
142. See OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, supra note 17; Data, Trends and Maps, supra note 140. R
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West Virginia, has the highest obesity rate in the nation (35.7%)143
and, nonetheless, provides coverage for bariatric surgery in its bench-
mark plan.144  Stingy benchmark plans in the South more likely derive
from general political animosity toward the ACA rather than cost con-
cerns or legitimate differences in interpretation of the federal statu-
tory language.145
Regardless of states’ underlying motivations, they have arrived at
very different interpretations of which treatments are required by the
ACA as Figure 1 makes clear.  The result, at least for obese individu-
als, is a patchwork of incongruous interpretations of what is compul-
sory for state benchmark plans, resulting in inconsistent insurance
coverage for medical weight-loss treatment across the states.  Cur-
rently, twenty-two states include bariatric surgery as a core benefit in
their benchmark plans, and only five states (plus Washington D.C.)
include nonsurgical weight-loss treatments as a core benefit.146
Twenty-eight states provide nothing, even though at least one-fifth
(and often a much greater proportion) of their populations are
obese.147  The next three Parts explain why the twenty-eight states
that presently deny coverage for any type of medical weight-loss treat-
ment in their benchmark plans are in violation of the ACA’s statutory
provisions and closely examine the language and relevant case law as-
sociated with the Act’s relevant statutory provisions.
IV. UNFULFILLED PROMISES OF ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS
Part III explained the origin of state-by-state discrepancies in medi-
cal weight-loss coverage, yet it raises a powerful follow-up question:
Which states have it right?148  Are the states that fail to cover medical
weight-loss treatments in their benchmark plans in violation of the
ACA?  Or, are the states that provide coverage for these treatments
going beyond the statutory requirements of the Act?  Part IV takes up
143. Prevalence of Self-Reported Obesity Among U.S. Adults by State and Territory, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/table-adults.html
144. OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, supra note 17. R
145. For popular discussions of the political opposition to the AVA in Southern states, see
Glen Browder, Exploring Southern States’ Opposition to Obamacare, HUFFINGTON POST, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/glen-browder/obamacare-opposition-southern-states_b_5050813.html
(last updated May 28, 2014, 5:59 AM); and Sarah Varney, How Obamacare Went South in Missis-
sippi, ATLANTIC (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/11/how-obama-
care-went-south-in-mississippi/382313/.
146. OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, supra note 17. R
147. Colorado has the lowest statewide obesity rate at 21.3%. See Prevalence of Self-Reported
Obesity Among U.S. Adults by State and Territory, supra note 143.
148. See supra notes 109–47. R
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this question by specifically examining the ACA’s guarantee of essen-
tial health benefit coverage under 42 U.S.C. § 18022.149
Section 18022(b)(1)(I) mandates insurance coverage of
“[p]reventative and wellness services and chronic disease manage-
ment.”150  Consequently, if obesity is properly characterized as a
“chronic disease,” then the ACA requires health plans to cover some
form of treatment to manage it.  But, is obesity properly characterized
as a chronic disease or as something else?  The most logical way of
answering this question would be to look to the definition of “chronic
disease” within the ACA and then use this definition to decide
whether obesity fits within the statutory definition.  The problem is
that Congress never defined “chronic disease” within the statute.151
The omission of this key definition is particularly notable because Ti-
tle IV of the Act is dedicated entirely to the “prevention of chronic
disease and improving public health.”152
In the years since the ACA’s passage, HHS has not filled in this
statutory gap by promulgating a rule that defines this term.  As a re-
sult, defining “chronic disease” requires turning elsewhere. When
Congress fails to define a key term within a statute, courts generally
look to the term’s “ordinary meaning.”153  One of the first places that
courts look to determine the ordinary meaning of a term is the dic-
tionary.154  The Oxford English Dictionary defines a disease as a “con-
dition of the body” or “a departure from the state of health”;155 it
defines chronic disease as a disease that is “[l]asting a long time, long-
continued, lingering, inveterate.”156  Given the scientific research doc-
umenting obesity’s role in the development of musculoskeletal condi-
tions, sleep apnea, diabetes, heart disease, and even cancer, it is easy
to argue that obesity (particularly severe or morbid obesity) repre-
sents a departure from the state of health.  In other words, obesity is a
disease.  Moreover, recalling the scientific research discussed in Sec-
tion II.A—which consistently, but pessimistically, concluded that as
many as 95% of obese individuals who tried to achieve long-term
149. See infra 150–72.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(I) (2012).
151. A definition of the term “chronic disease” is noticeably absent from all of the definition
sections within (or referenced by) the ACA, including §§ 18024, 18111, and 300gg-91.
152. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4001–4402, 124 Stat. 538, 538–588.
153. See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (2012) (citing Asgrow
Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995)) (“When terms used in a statute are undefined,
we give them their ordinary meaning.”).
154. See id. at 2002.
155. Disease, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2015).
156. Chronic Disease, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2015).
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weight loss without medical help would fail157—it is easy to argue that
obesity is a disease that is long continued, lingering, and inveterate.  In
other words, obesity is a chronic disease.
And, in fact, the major players in the medical field agree with this
characterization of obesity as a chronic disease.  In 2013, the Ameri-
can Medical Association (AMA) formally adopted a policy
“recogniz[ing] obesity as a disease requiring a range of medical inter-
ventions to advance obesity treatment and prevention.”158  Other
medical organizations that have characterized obesity as a chronic dis-
ease include the National Institutes of Health (NIH),159 the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),160 the World Health Or-
ganization,161 and the American Heart Association.162  The NIH and
CDC’s characterizations are particularly noteworthy because both
agencies are divisions of HHS, the umbrella agency in charge of issu-
ing regulations on the ACA.
The dictionary definition of chronic disease, the characterization
within the medical profession, and the usage within HHS all point to
the same conclusion: obesity is a chronic disease.  As mentioned, 42
U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(I) mandates that health plans cover manage-
ment of chronic diseases, yet obesity treatments are noticeably absent
from the list of covered treatments in the benchmark plans of twenty-
eight states.163  By wholly excluding all medical weight-loss treatments
from their benchmark plans, these states have ignored the ordinary
meaning of the term chronic disease and, thus, have failed to provide
157. See, e.g., Wooley & Garner, supra note 72. R
158. AMA Adopts New Policies on Second Day of Voting at Annual Meeting, AM. MED. ASS’N
(June 18, 2013), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2013/2013-06-18-new-ama-policies
-annual-meeting.page.
159. See, e.g., Genetic Influence in the Development of Overweight and Obesity, Guidelines on
Overweight an Obesity, NAT’L HEART, LUNG & BLOOD INST. (1998) http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/
guidelines/obesity/e_txtbk/ratnl/25.htm (describing obesity as “a complex multifactorial chronic
disease”).
160. Chronic Diseases: The Leading Causes of Death and Disability in the United States, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 18, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/over
view/ (characterizing obesity as a chronic disease that is one of the leading causes of death in the
United States).
161. See Controlling the Global Obesity Epidemic, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2003), http://
www.who.int/nutrition/topics/obesity/en/ (noting that “obesity is predominantly a ‘social and en-
vironmental disease’”); see also FAO/WHO Launch Expert Report on Diet, Nutrition, and Pre-
vention of Chronic Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 23, 2003), http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/releases/2003/pr32/en/ (characterizing obesity as well as cardiovascular dis-
ease, cancer, and diabetes as “chronic diseases”).
162. Treating Obesity as a Disease, AM. HEART ASS’N. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.heart.org/
HEARTORG/GettingHealthy/WeightManagement/Obesity/Treating-Obesity-as-a-Disease_UC
M_459557_Article.jsp.
163. OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, supra note 17. R
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their citizens with all of the essential health benefits guaranteed by the
ACA.
Of course, some might contest that obesity is not properly charac-
terized as a disease because, arguably, not all obese individuals are
unhealthy.  The “Health at Every Size” movement abounds with anec-
dotal evidence of obese individuals who eat healthy, regularly work
out regularly, and have low cholesterol.164  Nevertheless, the data dis-
cussed in Section I.A indicate that these individuals are the exception
not the rule.  Moreover, to the extent that obesity causes other
chronic diseases, medical weight-loss treatment can have profound ef-
fects on the management of these related diseases.  A meta-analysis in
the Journal of the American Medical Association concluded that after
bariatric surgery, 76.8% of obese patients with type 2 diabetes saw
their diabetes completely go into remission; another 11.2% saw im-
provement in their diabetes.  And, no one genuinely objects to diabe-
tes being labeled as a chronic disease.165
Still, others might argue that obesity is not properly characterized as
a disease because it is self-inflicted.  Proponents of this blame-the-pa-
tient argument might contest that society should not reward (and the
government should not subsidize treatment coverage for) a condition
that results from a lack of self-control.  There are several problems
with this argument.  One problem is that, as discussed in Section II.A,
researchers are still uncertain about the precise causes of obesity, but
they generally agree that obesity is, in some part, the result of chang-
ing environmental and social (i.e., not wholly individual) factors.166
Yet, even if it were true that an individual becomes obese purely be-
cause she lacks self-control, Section II.B illustrates that obesity has a
profound biological effect on the body, so even if a person wants to
lose weight, it becomes nearly impossible to do so.167  Finally, this ar-
gument ignores the fact that the ACA explicitly covers treatment of
other self-inflicted diseases.  No one seriously disputes coverage of
lung cancer and liver cancer treatments, even though these diseases
are common results of smoking and excessive drinking.168  The argu-
164. See generally LINDA BACON, HEALTH AT EVERY SIZE (2008) (arguing that death by fat is
a myth); LINDA BACON & LUCY APHRAMOR, BODY RESPECT: WHAT CONVENTIONAL HEALTH
BOOKS GET WRONG, LEAVE OUT, AND JUST PLAIN FAIL TO UNDERSTAND ABOUT WEIGHT
13–17 (2014) (noting that overweight people are shown to live longer than people who are
“normal”).
165. See Henry Buchwald et al., Bariatric Surgery: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,
292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1724, 1724, 1729 (2004).
166. See supra notes 51–66 and accompanying text. R
167. See supra notes 67–79 and accompanying text. R
168. See Liver Cancer, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/livercancer.html
(lasted updated Nov. 20, 2015) (“Risk factors for primary liver cancer include . . . [h]eavy alcohol
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ment also ignores the language of § 18022(b)(1)(E), which explicitly
guarantees coverage of “substance use disorder services, including be-
havioral health treatment” as an essential health benefit in insurance
plans.
The exclusion of obesity treatment from state benchmark plans be-
comes particularly discordant with the plain language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 18022 after considering the interpretive guidance that Congress pro-
vides the Secretary of HHS in §§ 18022(b)(4)(B)–(D).169  In “defining
the essential health benefits[,]” Congress directed HHS to “take into
account the health care needs of diverse segments of the population,
including women, children, [and] persons with disabilities.”170  The
statutory language further directed HHS “not to make coverage deci-
sions . . . or design benefits in ways that discriminate against individu-
als because of their . . . disability.”171  Additionally, HHS is directed to
“ensure that health benefits established as essential not be subject to
denial to individuals against their wishes on the basis of . . . the indi-
viduals’ present or predicted disability.”172  If obesity is properly char-
acterized as a disability, then failure to cover medical treatments for
obesity goes against the interpretive guidance provided in
§ 18022(b)(4).  Similarly, if obesity has a particularly negative impact
on a referenced, special-status group, such as women, then, again, the
failure to cover medical weight-loss treatments appears out of align-
ment with the interpretive guidance.  Part V takes up the issue of
obesity and disability,173 and Part VI focuses on obesity and
women.174
V. UNFULFILLED PROMISES OF DISABILITY NONDISCRIMINATION
One of the ACA’s core guarantees is that individuals will enjoy in-
surance coverage for essential health benefits, including chronic dis-
ease management.  Part IV demonstrated how obese individuals are
being denied this core guarantee in the states that do not cover medi-
cal weight-loss treatments in their benchmark plans.175  This Part turns
to examine another core guarantee of the ACA, nondiscrimination
and, in particular, the implications of the core guarantee of disability
use.”); Lung Cancer–Patient Version, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/types/lung
(last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (“Tobacco smoking is the most common cause of lung cancer.”).
169. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18022(b)(4)(B)–(D) (2012).
170. Id. § 18022(b)(4)(C).
171. Id.  § 18022(b)(4)(B).
172. Id. § 18022(b)(4)(D).
173. See infra notes 175–232 and accompanying text. R
174. See infra notes 233–73 and accompanying text. R
175. See supra notes 148–74 and accompanying text. R
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nondiscrimination for state benchmark plans that deny coverage of
medical weight-loss treatments for obese individuals.176
Recall from Part III that 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) protects individuals
from being “excluded from participation in, . . . denied the benefits of,
or . . . subjected to discrimination” in “any health program or activ-
ity.”177  In 2013, HHS issued a request for information regarding dis-
crimination in healthcare, indicating their intent to issue a proposed
rule interpreting Section 18116.178  The agency received over 150 com-
ments, many of which asked the agency to clarify whether certain
groups would be specifically protected and what it meant for a health
plan to discriminate.179  The resulting rule that HHS proposed is rela-
tively unhelpful in answering any of these questions because it merely
provides: “An issuer does not provide EHB [essential health benefits]
if its benefit design, or the implementation of its benefit design, dis-
criminates based on an individual’s age, expected length of life, pre-
sent or predicted disability, degree of medical dependency, quality of
life, or other health conditions.”180  Consequently, courts and state
policy makers have little more to guide them than the plain language
of § 18116 when attempting to comply with this section of the Act.
Fortunately, the plain language of § 18116 is more instructive than it
may appear on its face.  Instead of explicitly listing each protected
class under the ACA, Congress listed a series of civil rights acts.181  By
referencing these acts, Congress clarified that any type of discrimina-
tion made illegal by the listed acts would also be illegal under the
ACA.  Congress thus incorporated the meaning of discrimination
from other statutes—as derived by legislation, court decisions, and
regulations—into the ACA.  As a result, to determine whether a spe-
cific health care practice constitutes discrimination under the ACA,
courts and policy makers must evaluate whether the practice would
176. See infra notes 177–232 and accompanying text. R
177. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
178. Request for Information Regarding Nondiscrimination in Certain Health Programs or
Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 46,558, 46,559–60 (proposed Aug. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 156.125 (A) (2013)).
179. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs or Activities, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://
www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=HHS-OCR-2013-0007 (last visited Apr. 3, 2106) (162
comments received); see, e.g., ADAM KARPATI, N.Y.C. DEP’T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
HHS REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) REGARDING NONDISCRIMINATION IN CERTAIN
HEALTH PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES (Sept. 26, 2013); SUSAN PILCH, NAT’L CMTY. PHARMACISTS
ASS’N, 1557 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION—RIN 0945-AA02—NONDISCRIMINATION IN CERTAIN
HEALTH PROGRAMS OF ACTIVITIES (Sept. 30, 2013).
180. 45 C.F.R. § 156.125(a).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
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constitute discrimination in the context of any one of the listed civil
rights acts.
With regard to obesity, the most obvious type of discrimination that
might be implicated by the ACA’s nondiscrimination provision is disa-
bility discrimination.  Section 18116 prohibits disability discrimination
through its reference to a provision of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act).182  That section provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.183
The ACA’s reference to 29 U.S.C. § 794 implies that any condition
that is considered a disability under § 794 will also be a disability for
the purposes of § 18116.  The Rehabilitation Act defines what it
means to be disabled in the same manner as the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act of 1990 (ADA),184 which provides:
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment . . . .185
Thus, any individual who meets this definition of disability under
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act will also, by incorporation, meet
the definition of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 18116.  Congress did not
explicitly list conditions that qualified as disabilities under these acts
but, rather, elected to take a more flexible approach in defining what
it means to be disabled under federal law.  Accordingly, determining
whether obesity is a disability for purposes of the ACA requires exam-
ining how courts and federal agencies have viewed disability claims by
obese individuals under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.  The
next Section takes up this precise task.
182. Id.
183. Id.  See generally Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012)).
184. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (“[T]he term ‘individual with a disability’ means, for purposes
of . . . subchapter[ ] . . . V [,which contains § 794] . . . , any person who has a disability as defined
in section 12102 of title 42.”). See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-336, § 3, 104 Stat. 327, 330 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
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A. The Meaning of Disability Discrimination Under Federal Law
As obesity rates have risen in the United States, so has the amount
of litigation over whether obesity is a disability for purposes of the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act.  The early federal court and agency de-
cisions on this issue largely answered this question in the negative, but
recent Congressional amendments have caused them to reverse
course.  The first published case addressing the issue of obesity as a
disability came in 1993 from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit: Cook v. Department of Mental Health, Retardation & Hospi-
tals.186  In Cook, the court upheld a jury award of $100,000 to a job
applicant after the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health re-
fused to rehire the plaintiff, Bonnie Cook, as an institutional attend-
ant because she was morbidly obese.187   Cook, who had always been
morbidly obese, had previously held this position twice, voluntarily
leaving both times with an exemplary employment record.188  In
reaching its decision, the First Circuit placed particular importance on
the fact that Cook’s obesity arose from an underlying physiological
condition.  The court emphasized the evidence presented at trial indi-
cating that Cook would have to deal with a dysfunctional metabolism
for the rest of her life no matter how much weight she lost.189  Cook
could not “simply lose weight and rid herself of any concomitant disa-
bility”;190 therefore, the jury appropriately concluded that Cook was
disabled for purposes of the ADA.
The First Circuit appeared to have opened the door for coverage of
obese employees in Cook, but other federal courts did nothing but
close this door in the years immediately following.  U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals for the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits all distinguished or
disagreed with Cook over the course of the next decade.  For example,
in Andrews,191 the Sixth Circuit found that Ohio State Highway Patrol
officers who failed to meet the weight limits set by the Highway Patrol
Fitness Program were not disabled for purposes of the ADA.192  In
reaching this decision, the court asserted that “a mere physical charac-
teristic does not, without more, equal a physiological disorder” and
concluded that holding otherwise “would . . . debase [the] high pur-
pose [of] the statutory protections available to those truly handi-
186. 10 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1993).
187. Id. at 20–21, 28.
188. Id. at 20.
189. Id. at 24.
190. Id. at 23.
191. 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997).
192. Id. at 810.
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capped.”193  To distinguish its holding from Cook, the court pointed
out that the Cook plaintiff had presented expert testimony that her
morbid obesity arose from a physiological impairment of her metabo-
lism.194  Nine years later, in EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., the
Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the Andrews decision.195
The Second and Eleventh Circuits were also less generous to obese
plaintiffs in their early decisions.  In Francis v. City of Meriden,196 the
Second Circuit declined to recognize that a firefighter, who failed to
meet the department weight standard and refused to take a body fat
or fitness test, was disabled for purposes of the ADA.197  The Second
Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit that physical characteristics that
do not arise from a physiological condition were not impairments
under the statute.198  In Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecommunications,
Inc.,199 which was brought by an obese telephone lineman who suf-
fered from additional physiological conditions—including diabetes,
hypertension, and hypothyroidism—did not end well for the plain-
tiff.200  In Greenberg, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was
not disabled for purposes of the ADA because, in spite of the evi-
dence demonstrating his poor health, the plaintiff failed to demon-
strate that he was “unable to work in a broad class of jobs.”201
Yet, these unfavorable federal court rulings largely reversed course
in 2008.  In that year, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 (ADAAA)202 in response to the restrictive decisions that federal
courts had been making with regard to all plaintiffs claiming a disabil-
ity under the acts (not just obese plaintiffs).203  The ADAAA clarified
193. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986)).
194. Id. at 809 (citing Cook, 10 F.3d 17).
195. 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006).  The court held that “to constitute an ADA impairment, a
person’s obesity, even morbid obesity, must be the result of a physiological condition.” Id. at
443.
196. 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997).
197. Id. at 282–83, 87.
198. Id. at 285.
199. 498 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2007).
200. Id. at 1259–60, 1265.
201. Id. at 1264 (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1991)).
202. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
203. In passing the ADAAA, Congress specifically reversed four restrictive and very influen-
tial U.S. Supreme Court decisions from the turn of the millennium. See id. §§ 2(b)(4)–(5).  The
first three decisions, nicknamed the “Sutton trilogy,” consisted of Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirk-
ingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999), and
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).  Decided together on June 22, 1999, the three
cases severely limited the definition of disability under the original version of the ADA by hold-
ing that an individual was not disabled if corrective measures could ameliorate the individual’s
condition. See Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 565; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 517–21; Sutton, 527 U.S. at
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Congress’s intent that the ADA (and, by incorporation, the Rehabili-
tation Act) would encompass a broad range of health conditions.
Along these lines, the ADAAA expressly instructed federal courts to
construe the definition of disability in these acts “in favor of broad
coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent
permitted.”204
Congress’s instructions have markedly impacted the ADA and Re-
habilitation Act decisions of federal courts over the past six years.  In
Lowe v. American Eurocopter, LLC,205 a Mississippi district court de-
nied summary judgment to an employer who argued that obesity
could never be a disability for purposes of the ADA, concluding:
“Based on the substantial expansion of the ADA by the ADAAA,
Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff’s weight cannot be considered a
disability is misplaced.”206  Another district court in Louisiana simi-
larly found that a plaintiff’s obesity was a disability because it substan-
tially limited her breathing, which was a major life activity.207
Moreover, a recent case from a Missouri district court also agreed that
obesity claims under the ADA will fare much better in the post-
ADAAA regime.208  The district court in Whittaker v. America’s Car
Mart, Inc. agreed that the pre-ADAAA case law, which required
“obesity . . .  [to be] related to an underlying physiological disorder or
condition . . . .  [This requirement was] based on the more restrictive
approach that was applied before Congress passed the [ADAAA].”209
Similar to federal courts, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), the agency charged with enforcing the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act, has reversed course on the issue of obesity.  The
582–83l.  The fourth case, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, decided in
2002, even more severely limited the definition of disability under the original ADA by holding
that “the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks
central to most people’s daily lives, not whether the claimant is unable to perform the tasks
associated with her specific job.” 534 U.S. 184, 200–01 (2002).  According to this decision, a
plaintiff would not be disabled for purposes of the ADA—even if her impairment substantially
limited her ability to do her job—unless her impairment also substantially limited her ability to
function in daily life.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(1)(A) (2012).
205. No. 1:10CV24-A-D, 2010 WL 5232523 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010).
206. Id. at *8.
207. Melson v. Chetofield, No. 08-3683, 2009 WL 537457, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2009).  In
spite of the district court’s finding that the plaintiff was disabled for the purposes of the ADA,
the court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s case for failure to state a claim because she failed to
demonstrate in her pleading that she had either experienced an adverse employment action or
endured a hostile work environment due to her disability. Id. at *6–7.
208. Whittaker v. Am.’s Car Mart, Inc., No. 1:13CV108 SNLJ, 2014 WL 1648816, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 24, 2014).
209. Id.
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agency’s prior guidance stated that obesity would only be a covered
disability under the ADA in “rare circumstances.”210  However, the
current guidance has no mention of this language.211  The EEOC’s
definition of severe obesity roughly equates to the medical definition
of morbid obesity (a BMI of forty or more).
In addition to revising its compliance guidelines, the EEOC has also
filed two successful ADA lawsuits involving morbidly obese plaintiffs
following the passage of the ADAAA.  In September 2010, the EEOC
filed its first obesity-related public interest suit, EEOC v. Resources
for Human Development, Inc.212  The plaintiff, Lisa Harrison, who
was morbidly obese, had been terminated from her job at a New Orle-
ans residential treatment facility despite an excellent performance re-
cord.213  In contrast to the pre-ADAAA decisions, here, the district
court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding
that Harrison’s “severe obesity . . . [was] clearly an impairment.”214
Before the case could go to trial, Harrison’s employer settled with the
EEOC for $125,000.215
The EEOC filed its second public interest suit, EEOC v. BAE Sys-
tems, Inc.,216 in September 2011.  The case arose after a Houston em-
ployer, BAE Systems, terminated a morbidly obese employee, Ronald
Kratz, because of his weight.217  Although Kratz weighed approxi-
mately 450 pounds at hiring and 680 pounds at termination, Kratz was
210.  Appendix to Part 1630—Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (2003).
211. See Appendix to Part 1630—Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (2013).
212. 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. La. 2011).
213. Id. at 690. The plaintiff in this case weighed over 400 pounds at the time of her hiring and
weighed 527 pounds at the time of her termination. Id.
214. Id. at 694.  Reflecting the sea change since Congress enacted the ADAAA, the court
explicitly held that the EEOC did not need to prove the underlying physiological basis of the
plaintiff’s obesity in order to gain the protection of the ADA. Id.
215. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Resources for Human Develop-
ment Settles EEOC Disability Suit for $125,000 (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/news-
room/release/4-10-12a.cfm.
216. No. 4:11-cv-03497 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 27, 2011); Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportu-
nity Comm’n, BAE Systems Subsidiary To Pay $55,000 To Settle EEOC Disability Discrimina-
tion Suit (July 24, 2012), http://s3.amazonaws.com/fcmd/documents/documents/000/002/698/
original/bae-systems-kratz_july-2012-update_eeocpr.pdf?1423021272.
217. L.M. Sixel, Feds Sue Company for Firing 600-Pound Worker, HOUSTON CHRON., http://
www.chron.com/default/article/Feds-sue-company-for-firing-600-pound-worker-2191655.php
(last updated Sept. 28, 2011, 12:29 AM); L.M. Sixel, Fired Obese Worker Will Get $55,000, HOUS-
TON CHRON. [hereinafter Sixel, Fired Worker], http://www.chron.com/default/article/Fired-
obese-worker-will-get-55-000-3732044.php (last updated July 25, 2012, 9:03 AM); L.M. Sixel,
Man Fired at 680 Pounds Says Weight Didn’t Hurt His Work, HOUSTON CHRON.,  http://
www.chron.com/default/article/Man-fired-at-680-pounds-says-weight-didn-t-hurt-2193407.php
(last updated Sept. 29, 2011, 12:10 AM).
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able to perform the essential functions of his job throughout his em-
ployment.  Before the district court could rule on any motions (but
after the favorable Resources for Human Development decision and
settlement), BAE Systems settled the suit with the EEOC for
$55,000.218
In sum, although some courts were initially hesitant to recognize
obesity as a disability for purposes of the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act, that hesitance is waning in the years since the passage of the
ADAAA—at least for morbidly obese individuals.  Indeed, it is easy
to see how obesity, particularly in its most severe form, fits within the
statutory definition.  As discussed in Part II, obesity often leads to the
development of musculoskeletal conditions, sleep apnea, diabetes,
heart disease, and other diseases.219  To the extent that obesity (or a
secondary condition caused by obesity) substantially interferes with
major life activities, such as walking, standing, breathing, or sleeping,
obesity clearly falls within the statutory definition of disability under
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
Even when obesity does not interfere with major life activities,
obesity easily falls under the “regarded as” substantially limited defi-
nition in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).220  Recall the EEOC case of Ronald
Kratz, for example, in which Kratz was terminated because of his
weight despite the fact that he could perform the essential functions of
his job.  Although he was not substantially limited in a major life ac-
tivity, his employer regarded him as substantially limited, which quali-
fied Kratz as disabled for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act.221  In the post-ADAAA regime, morbidly obese individuals, as
well as obese individuals who have developed a secondary condition
caused by their weight, can make a strong case that they are disabled
under federal disability law.
B. Denial of Coverage as a Form of Disability Discrimination
Of course, more is required than proving the existence of a disabil-
ity to allege a violation of the ACA.  Under 42 U.S.C. § 18116, alleg-
ing this type of violation requires proof that an individual was: (1)
“excluded from participation in, . . . denied the benefits of, or . . .
subjected to discrimination under[ ] any health program or activity; or
218. Sixel, Fired Worker, supra note 217. R
219. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. R
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2012).
221. See supra notes 217–218 and accompanying text (discussing the details of the EEOC’s R
lawsuit).
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excluded (2) “on the ground” of disability.222  As mentioned in Sec-
tion A, HHS’s proposed rule on nondiscrimination does not provide
any guidance on what it means for a health plan to exclude, deny ben-
efits to, or discriminate against an individual.223  Nonetheless, in No-
vember 2014, HHS released a Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016, which provided some insight behind the pro-
posed rules.  Within its commentary on §156.125, HHS made the fol-
lowing warning to insurers:
We also caution issuers to avoid discouraging enrollment of individ-
uals with chronic health needs. For example, if an issuer refuses to
cover a single-tablet drug regimen or extended-release product that
is customarily prescribed and is just as effective as a multi-tablet
regimen, we believe that, absent an appropriate reason for such re-
fusal, such a plan design effectively discriminates against, or dis-
courages enrollment by, individuals who would benefit from such
innovative therapeutic options. As another example, if an issuer
places most or all drugs that treat a specific condition on the highest
cost tiers, we believe that such plan designs effectively discriminate
against, or discourage enrollment by, individuals who have those
chronic conditions.224
This language clarifies the agency’s understanding that discrimina-
tion under the ACA includes any action taken by the states, or insur-
ers, that will tend to “discourage enrollment by” individuals with
“chronic health needs” or individuals who are a member of another
protected group.225  Actions by insurers that tend to discourage en-
rollment by these individuals include refusal to cover “effective . . .
innovative therapeutic options” and “plac[ing] . . . all drugs that treat
a specific condition on the highest cost tiers.”226  Meanwhile, obese
individuals in twenty-eight states face treatment by insurers that is
much worse than HHS’s examples.  For them, the problem is not that
insurers refuse to cover the most innovative therapies or that they of-
fer only limited coverage of drugs that treat obesity, the problem is
that insurers refuse to cover any therapies at all.
To the extent that states and insurers might try to offer an “appro-
priate reason”227 for refusing to cover medical weight-loss treatments
for obese individuals, they might complain that treatment coverage
222. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
223. See supra notes 186–218 and accompanying text. R
224. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Pa-
rameters for 2016, 79 Fed. Reg. 70,674, 70,723 (proposed Nov. 26, 2014) (to be codified in scat-
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costs will be unsustainable, particularly in states with high obesity
rates.  But this argument loses credibility after considering that two of
the states with the highest obesity rates in the nation, Michigan and
West Virginia, cover medical weight-loss treatments in their state
benchmark plans.  The argument is even harder to justify given the
research demonstrating the cost savings that insurers enjoy after an
obese patient completes medical weight-loss treatment due to an over-
all improvement in the patient’s health.228
After reading HHS’s guidance on nondiscrimination, it is difficult to
draw any other conclusion but the following: denial of medical weight-
loss treatment is impermissibly discriminatory under the ACA.  HHS’s
examples regarding denial of treatment for chronic health needs speak
directly to the issues faced by many obese individuals.  Nonetheless,
even ignoring the agency’s guidance, a denial of medical weight-loss
treatment still appears to directly conflict with the ACA’s statutory
language.  Section 18116 of the ACA prohibits health plans from
“den[ying] . . . benefits” to individuals “on the ground” of disability as
that term is defined within the Rehabilitation Act.229   Health plans in
twenty-eight states are currently denying any medical weight-loss
treatment benefits to obese individuals who could benefit from
them.230  And, as Section A discussed, obesity—at least in its most
severe forms, when medical weight-loss treatments can be most bene-
ficial—is now recognized by federal courts as a disability for purposes
of the Rehabilitation Act.  Thus, the state benchmark plans that re-
fuse to cover weight-loss treatments deny benefits to obese individuals
on the basis of their disability and, as a result, violate § 18116.
In addition to violating § 18116, states that do not cover medical
weight-loss treatments in their benchmark plans run afoul of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 18022(4)(B)–(D).231  Recall from Part III that in these Sections,
Congress offers interpretive guidance in how to construe the term “es-
sential health benefit.”  Among other things, Congress instructs that
essential health benefits should “take into account the health care
needs of . . . persons with disabilities” and “not . . . discriminate
against individuals because of their . . . disability.”232  Here, again,
states that do not cover medical weight-loss treatments in their bench-
mark plans appear to go directly against Congress’s wishes.  Because
228. See, e.g., Cre´mieux et al., supra note 106, at 590–91 (finding that the health care cost R
savings associated with improved health after bariatric surgery will offset the initial cost of the
procedure in two to four years).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012).
230. OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, supra note 17. R
231. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 18022(4)(B)–(D).
232. Id. §§ 18022(4)(B)–(C).
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the ACA takes its definition of disability from the Rehabilitation Act,
then, by incorporation, obesity (particularly severe or morbid obesity)
should be considered a disability for purposes of the ACA.  By failing
to include weight-loss treatment as an essential health benefit, states
do not take into account—indeed, they do not even acknowledge—
the health care needs of persons who are legally disabled.
VI. UNFULFILLED PROMISES OF SEX NONDISCRIMINATION
State benchmark plans’ failure to cover medical weight-loss treat-
ments on the basis of a disability represents a classic case of disparate
treatment discrimination.  In a disparate treatment discrimination
case, “liability depends on whether the protected trait . . . actually
motivated the . . . decision.”233  “The ultimate question” in a disparate
treatment case, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, “is whether the
[accused] intentionally discriminated.”234  In the argument presented
above in Part V, by choosing a benchmark plan that wholly excluded
treatment for a medical condition (obesity), states (and insurers
within these states) intentionally treated a class of legally disabled in-
dividuals differently than they treated everyone else.235  Thus, states
disparately treat, and discriminate against the disabled, contrary to
Congress’s directives.
This Part considers a second type of discrimination: disparate im-
pact.  Disparate impact discrimination consists of “practices that are
not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately ad-
verse effect” on a protected group.236  Specifically, this Part examines
the disproportionately adverse effects that obesity has on women and
how these effects implicate the nondiscrimination provision of the
ACA.237  Section A discusses research on the disparate impact that
obesity has on sex,238 and Section B explores the scenarios in which
federal law prohibits disparate impact discrimination.239  Section C
specifically considers whether disparate impact discrimination is pro-
hibited under the ACA and whether states’ refusals to cover medical
weight-loss treatment in their benchmark plans rise to the level of dis-
parate impact discrimination against women.240
233. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (quoting Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).
234. Id. at 146.
235. See supra notes 223–232 and accompanying text. R
236. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
237. See infra notes 241–73 and accompanying text. R
238. See infra notes 241–48 and accompanying text. R
239. See infra notes 249–62 and accompanying text. R
240. See infra notes 263–73 and accompanying text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-4\DPL401.txt unknown Seq: 39 11-OCT-16 7:40
2016] UNFULFILLED PROMISES 1273
A. Weight as a Woman’s Issue
The realities of being an obese woman are much harsher than the
realities of being an obese man.  Indeed, academic research from mul-
tiple disciplines have confirmed that weight can impede a woman’s
success in almost every aspect of her life, yet it does not create the
same barriers for men.  As early as 1979, with the publication of Susie
Orbach’s book, Fat is a Feminist Issue, psychology researchers have
recognized that weight has a particularly negative effect on women.
For instance, a 2004 study found that obese women had a lower qual-
ity of life than obese men, reporting higher levels of social distress in
public.241  Another study from 2010 asked participants to evaluate po-
litical candidates and found that subjects were quite critical of obese
female candidates but not of obese male candidates.242  Still, another
study from 2011, which questioned adolescents about their attitudes
on weight, similarly revealed disturbing, gender-based conclusions:
the male and female subjects made statements such as, “[I would]
rather be a fat guy than a fat girl” and “[i]t’s more normal for guys to
be overweight.”243
The disparate effects of weight on women go far beyond psychologi-
cal measures.  Empirical research over the past two decades has con-
sistently demonstrated that obesity has grave social and economic
consequences for women that it does not have for men.  Demographic
and labor market data reveal that obese women marry spouses with
lower levels of education and lower earnings than the spouses of no-
nobese women.244  Further, obese women cannot compensate for their
spouses’ lower income in the labor market; studies examining how
obese women fare in employment are even more pessimistic.  For ex-
ample, a 2004 empirical study, reported that obese women earn lower
wages than nonobese women even after accounting for differences in
education, demographics, and socioeconomic status; no effect was pre-
241. See Marney A. White et al., Gender, Race, and Obesity-Related Quality of Life at Extreme
Levels of Obesity, 12 OBESITY RES. 949, 951–54 (2004).
242. See Beth J. Miller & Jennifer D. Lundgren, An Experimental Study of the Role of Weight
Bias in Candidate Evaluation, 18 OBESITY 712, 715 (2010).
243. Nicole L. Taylor, “Guys She’s Humongous!”: Gender and Weight-Based Teasing in Ado-
lescence, 26 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 178, 187 (2011).
244. See, e.g., Pierre-Andre´ Chiappori et al., Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeco-
nomic Matching on the Marriage Market, 120 J. POL. ECON. 659, 662 (2012) (citing Susan L.
Averett et al., For Better or Worse: Relationship Status and Body Mass Index, 6 ECON. & HUM.
BIOLOGY 330, 348 (2008); Susan Averett & Sanders Korenman, The Economic Reality of the
Beauty Myth, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 304, 314–18, 326 (1996); and Sankar Mukhopadhyay, Do
Women Value Marriage More? The Effect of Obesity on Cohabitation and Marriage in the USA,
6 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 111, 118–24 (2008)).
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sent for obese men.245  Along these lines, a very recent study ex-
amined differences in the occupational characteristics of obese and
non-obese employees and found that employers exclude obese
women, but not obese men, from jobs that require interaction with
customers and with the public.246  Exclusion from these jobs is particu-
larly detrimental to obese women because, on average, public interac-
tion occupations are high paying and have pleasant working
conditions.  As a result, the study found that obese women were
forced to take the few jobs available to them—jobs that often re-
quired physical labor, had poor working conditions, and were low
paying.247
The above studies reveal that living with obesity is a much different
experience for women than it is for men.  Obese women face eco-
nomic, social, and psychological barriers not encountered by obese
men. As a result, medical weight-loss treatment has more to offer
women than men; not only does this treatment offer the chance to
escape the negative health effects associated with the disease, but, for
women, it also offers the chance to escape the negative economic, so-
cial, and psychological effects of the disease.  In other words, denying
insurance coverage for medical weight-loss treatment to obese indi-
viduals has a disparate impact on women.  This disparate impact may
extend beyond the economic, social, and psychological arenas; recent
medical evidence suggests that the disparate impact of denying treat-
ment may also extend to the health arena.  Three different studies
from the past six years have all concluded that bariatric surgery
reduces subsequent obesity-related cancer risk in women more than it
does in men.248  Once again, the evidence indicates that women have a
lot more to gain from access to medical weight-loss treatment—and a
lot more to lose from denial of coverage.  Considering this disparate
impact on women, the next two Sections take up the question of
whether this situation presents a cognizable claim of discrimination
under federal law and, specifically, under the ACA.
245. See John Cawley, The Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 451, 451–52
(2004).
246. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability? Evaluating the Legal Framework for
Protecting Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 5 (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 5).
247. See id. (manuscript at 39).
248. See Ted D. Adams et al., Cancer Incidence and Mortality After Gastric Bypass Surgery, 17
OBESITY 796, 801–02 (2009); Lars Sjo¨stro¨m et al., Effects of Bariatric Surgery on Cancer Inci-
dence in Obese Patients in Sweden (Swedish Obese Subjects Study): A Prospective, Controlled
Intervention Trial, 10 LANCET ONCOLOGY 653, 657–60 (2009); Xiang-wu Yang et al., Effects of
Bariatric Surgery on Incidence of Obesity-Related Cancers: A Meta-Analysis, 21 MED. SCI. MONI-
TOR 1350, 1355 (2015).
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B. The Meaning of Sex Discrimination Under Federal Law
When the term “discrimination” appears in any federal statute, it
always encompasses the idea of disparate treatment.  Disparate treat-
ment is arguably the “ordinary meaning”249 of the word “discrimina-
tion” in the English language.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines
discrimination as “[t]he action of perceiving, noting, or making a dis-
tinction between things[,]” which implies the presence of intent.250
Nonetheless, courts have recognized disparate impact—which does
not require proof of intent—as a form of discrimination under some
federal statutes, but not all.  The U.S. Supreme Court first endorsed
the theory of disparate impact as a form of federally prohibited dis-
crimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,251 a 1971 case brought
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  In striking down a neu-
tral job requirement that had the effect of excluding African-Ameri-
cans, the Court recognized that the term discrimination “proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation.”252
Forty years later, the Court still recognizes the disparate impact the-
ory as cognizable in Title VII discrimination cases.253  The Court has
been less generous with other statutes: for instance, the Court has pro-
hibited individuals from bringing a private right of action for disparate
impact under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.254  Even though
Title VI, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in federally funded programs, arises from the same Act
as Title VII,255 the Court has asserted that congressional intent re-
garding the scope of the two titles was different.256  The Court has also
refused to recognize disparate impact claims in Equal Protection
cases, holding that discriminatory intent is required to rise to the level
249. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (2012).
250. Discrimination, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2016).
251. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
252. Id. at 431.
253. E.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (“Title VII prohibits both intentional
discrimination (known as ‘disparate treatment’) as well as, in some cases, practices that are not
intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities
(known as ‘disparate impact’).”).  Although Title VII did not explicitly include a disparate im-
pact theory within its statutory language at the time that Griggs was decided in 1971, Congress
explicitly added prohibitions against disparate impact discrimination into Title VII with the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071,
1074–75 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012)).
254. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285–89 (2001).
255. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
256. See, e.g., Alexander, 532 U.S. at 280–81; Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582, 617 (1983) ( “Title VI’s proscription of racial discrimination is coextensive
with the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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of a constitutional violation.257  Nonetheless, the Court has explicitly
recognized disparate impact claims as cognizable in discrimination
claims brought under many other nondiscrimination statutes, includ-
ing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),258 the Fair
Housing Act (FHA),259 and the ADA.260
With the Court’s prior decisions in mind, the question at hand be-
comes whether the ACA’s nondiscrimination provision should be in-
terpreted in line with the ADEA, FHA, and the ADA—or whether it
should be interpreted more strictly, in line with the Equal Protection
Clause.  In other words, does the ACA’s prohibition of discrimination
in health plans encompass coverage decisions that lack the intent to
discriminate?  As discussed in Part V, the statutory language of 42
U.S.C. § 18116 is completely unhelpful in this regard because it does
not provide any definition of the term “discrimination.”261  Moreover,
the HHS regulations and guidance have not filled in this obvious and
important gap.  In the absence of any obvious direction by Congress
or HHS, a more careful study of the ACA’s statutory language is re-
quired to determine whether Congress left any hints as to the in-
tended meaning of the term discrimination. The next Section is
devoted to this study.262
C. Denial of Coverage as a Form of Sex Discrimination
Determining whether the ACA’s nondiscrimination provision pro-
hibits disparate impact discrimination requires revisiting the language
of 42 U.S.C. § 18116 once again.  In § 18116(a), sex discrimination is
prohibited in health plans via a reference to Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.263  Congress could have more simply stated that
sex discrimination was prohibited in health care, but, instead, Con-
gress chose to reference Title IX.  Consequently, under the same argu-
ment made in Part IV, Congress incorporated the meaning of sex
257. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced
the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact.”).
258. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (finding that the dispa-
rate impact theory is not categorically unavailable under the ADEA).
259. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015) (“[D]isparate-
impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act . . . .”).
260. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (“Both disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the ADA.”).
261. See supra notes 178–232 and accompanying text. R
262. See infra notes 263–73 and accompanying text. R
263. See 42 U.S.C. §  18116(a) (2012); Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318,
§ 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012)).
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discrimination from Title IX into the ACA.  As a result, if Title IX
prohibits disparate impact discrimination on the basis of sex, then so
should the ACA.
Congress passed Title IX after a series of lawsuits brought to light
the pervasive bias against women working in higher education.264
Since its passage, however, the Act has become most well known for
its positive impact on the funding of girls’ sports programs.265  The Act
provides the following: “No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”266  The statutory
language itself is not helpful in determining whether disparate impact
is a cognizable theory under the statute; indeed, the phrase “be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination” is precisely the same language used by the nondis-
crimination provision of the ACA in 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).267  The leg-
islative history is also unhelpful.  Title IX’s passage was clearly
motivated by the existence of intentional discrimination, but so was
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and it recognizes the disparate
impact theory.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never considered whether disparate
impact is a cognizable theory of discrimination under Title IX.  None-
theless, the federal courts that have considered the question have an-
swered it in the affirmative.268  The Title IX regulations issued by the
U.S. Department of Education seem to embrace the disparate impact
theory because they prohibit educational institutions from “adminis-
ter[ing] or operat[ing] any test or other criterion for admission which
has a disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of
sex.”269  In its legal manual, the U.S. Department of Justice recog-
264. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL 16–17 (Jan. 11,
2001) [hereinafter TITLE IX MANUAL], http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/ixlegal.pdf.
265. See, e.g., Steve Wulf, Title IX: 37 Words that Changed Everything, ESPN (Apr. 29, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/espnw/title-ix/article/7722632/37-words-changed-everything (acknowledging
the impact of the statute on women’s collegiate sports).
266. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
267. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
268. See, e.g., Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1231 (9th Cir 1994) (finding that intent was not
required to violate Title IX); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832–33 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that disparate impact is a cognizable theory of liability under Title IX because
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is “the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX’s
substantive standards,” and that “Title VII does not require proof of overt discrimination”).
269. 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(b)(2) (2015) (emphasis added).
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nized that disparate impact sex discrimination claims may be brought
under Title IX.270
Assuming that the U.S. Supreme Court would agree with the weight
of the authority from lower courts and agencies, then disparate impact
is a cognizable theory of sex discrimination under Title IX.  And, if
disparate impact is a cognizable theory of sex discrimination under
Title IX, then, by incorporation, it should also be a cognizable theory
of sex discrimination under § 18116 of the ACA.271  Using the evi-
dence presented in Part V.A, obese women have an argument that
insurance plans’ denials of medical weight-loss treatment coverage
have a disparate impact on their psychological, social, economic, and
physical well-being.  By reducing obese women’s access to medical
weight-loss treatment, states and insurers inhibit obese women—but
not obese men—in virtually every aspect of their lives.  In response to
such an argument by obese women, states and insurance companies
might try to assert the defense that the cost of providing this coverage
is unsustainable and, as such, denying this coverage is a business ne-
cessity for insurance companies.  This potential defense is quite weak,
however, given the empirical evidence that medical weight-loss treat-
ments eventually lead to cost savings for insurers.272  As a result, the
failure of twenty-eight state benchmark plans to cover medical weight-
loss treatment appears to give rise to liability for sex-based discrimina-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 18116 based on the disparate impact caused by
the denial of benefits.  This liability exists in addition to any liability
for disability discrimination under § 18116.
Finally, in addition to liability under § 18116, the failure to cover
medical weight-loss treatments appears to run afoul of 42 U.S.C.
§ 18022(4)(C).  As discussed in Part IV, Congress directed HHS to
“take into account the health care needs of diverse segments of the
population, including women,” when determining what constitutes an
essential health benefit under the ACA.273  Because obesity (and,
hence, failure to receive medical treatment for obesity) has such a dis-
270. See TITLE IX MANUAL, supra note 264, at 63 (discussing the disparate impact theory of R
discrimination under Title IX).
271. Recent scholarship on the ACA’s nondiscrimination provision agrees that the § 18116, by
incorporation from Title IX, includes liability for disparate impact discrimination on the basis of
sex. See Elizabeth B. Deutsch, Expanding Conscience, Shrinking Care: The Crisis in Access to
Reproductive Care and the Affordable Care Act’s Nondiscrimination Mandate, 124 YALE L. J.
2470, 2491–93 (2015) (“Section 1557 incorporates the private right of action for disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact claims provided in Title IX.”).
272. See, e.g., Cre´mieux et al., supra note 106, at 53–54 (finding that the health care cost R
savings associated with improved health after bariatric surgery will offset the initial cost of the
procedure in two to four years).
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(4)(C); supra notes 151–72 and accompanying text. R
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parate impact on women, state benchmark plans that exclude medical
weight-loss treatments from their list of covered treatments appear to
go directly against Congress’s wishes.  In sum, the conclusion drawn
by twenty-eight states that the ACA does not require coverage of
medical weight-loss treatments flies in the face of the Act’s require-
ments of nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, disability, and guaran-
teed essential health benefits.  Yet, twenty-eight states are currently
getting away with interpreting the ACA in this manner.  How are
these states getting away with it—better still, why is HHS letting them
get away with it?  The final Part focuses on precisely this question.
VII. CONCLUSION: A CALL TO ACTION FOR FEDERAL
FULFILLMENT
The ACA makes grandiose promises of sweeping reform in the
health care system with the stated goal of ensuring “that in this coun-
try the security of health care is not a privilege for a fortunate few.”274
To achieve this goal, the statute extensively relies on HHS to enforce
these grandiose promises—so frequently that the Act references the
HHS Secretary more than 3,000 times within its provisions.275  And,
although HHS has already issued many regulations in the six years
since the ACA’s passage, most notably the contraception coverage
mandate276 and the Patient’s Bill of Rights,277 HHS has largely
dodged its responsibility to regulate and provide guidance on two of
the ACA’s core provisions, essential health benefits and nondiscrimi-
nation.  By deferring to the states to precisely decide what these terms
mean, HHS allows states to have the final word on which treatments
and conditions must be covered by health plans.
The result is inconsistency of health plan coverage across the states.
As this Article has pointed out, obese individuals in twenty-eight
states endure inequities of coverage without any good explanation
other than that their state did not deem medical weight-loss treatment
important or worthwhile enough to include in its benchmark plan.278
The result is a patchwork system of complete coverage, some cover-
age, and no coverage across states without any logic or reason behind
it.  The inequities of such a patchwork system become particularly ap-
274. Remarks on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 716, at 6 (Oct. 21, 2013).
275. TEVI TROY, HUDSON INST. “THE SECRETARY SHALL” HOW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WILL AFFECT DOCTORS 2 (May 2012), http://www.hudson.org/
content/researchattachments/attachment/1034/secshalltroy—052212web.pdf.
276. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2015).
277. See id. § 147.136.
278. OBESITY CARE CONTINUUM, supra note 17. R
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parent for individuals who live in metropolitan areas that encompass
more than one state.  Obese individuals who work in New York City,
for example, are guaranteed coverage for bariatric surgery if they
choose to live in the city or a New Jersey suburb, but, if they choose to
live in a Connecticut suburb, they are out of luck.279
These interstate inconsistencies are more than just annoying or in-
convenient; they are at odds with the plain language of the ACA.  In
the case of obesity, state benchmark plans’ continued failure to guar-
antee coverage of medical weight-loss treatments conflicts with the
ACA’s directives not to discriminate on the basis of disability (42
U.S.C. § 18116(a)), not to discriminate on the basis of sex (42 U.S.C.
§ 18116(a)), and not to withhold benefits for the management of
chronic disease (42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(I)).  Nonetheless, twenty-
eight states continue to get away with not providing coverage for med-
ical weight-loss treatment without any recourse from HHS.
This Article focused on the example of obesity, principally because
of the injustices that have arisen from HHS’s punting its regulatory
authority to the states are so obvious.  Here is a situation in which a
disease affects one-third of the United States, medically effective
treatments for the disease exist, and federal law guarantees insurance
coverage of these treatments, yet only one-half of the affected popula-
tion enjoys the supposed coverage.  More troubling is the fact that
obesity is not an anomaly.  In fact, individuals with a wide range of
other conditions face exactly the same situation as obese individuals.
This Article’s Introduction mentioned the frustrations faced by par-
ents of children with special needs, whose state of residence may de-
termine whether their children are covered by insurance for the
medically effective treatments they need or whether lack of coverage
renders the treatments financially out of reach.280
Even for parents of children without special needs, the ACA has
failed to live up to its explicit promises in some states.  Section
18022(b)(1)(J) of the ACA expressly guarantees that insurance plans
will cover “[p]ediatric services, including oral and vision care” as an
essential health benefit, using language that could not be any
clearer.281  Nonetheless, a report prepared by research fellows at the
Georgetown University Health Policy Institute revealed that as of Oc-
tober 2014, thirty states neither required the purchase of pediatric
dental coverage nor issued any guidance for insurers on pediatric den-
279. Id.
280. See Rosenbaum & Noonan, supra note 11. R
281. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(J) (2012).
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tal coverage.282  According to the report, a similar situation has arisen
for individuals in need of rehabilitative services.  Even though these
services are guaranteed coverage in § 18022(b)(1)(G), the lack of a
state policy on these services renders the reality of coverage uncertain
for individuals in eleven states.283
All of these inconsistencies in coverage, which still exist six years
after passage in spite of the guarantees of the ACA, raise the same
question: Why does HHS continue to allow the states to define their
own benchmark plans?  As long as states are allowed to select their
own benchmark plans, inconsistencies in insurance coverage will con-
tinue to arise between states.  States will continue to disagree about
what is required under the essential health benefits and nondiscrimi-
nation guarantees of the ACA—sometimes because of differences in
statutory interpretation and sometimes because of differences in polit-
ics.  Regardless of states’ underlying motivations, in the absence of
more specific federal regulations and stronger federal enforcement,
situations will continue to arise in which residents of one state enjoy
drastically better ACA-mandated insurance coverage than residents
of a neighboring state.
As complicated as navigating the differences in state benchmark
plans has become, the problem has a simple solution: HHS should
cease deferring to the states and establish its own federal benchmark
plan.  The plan would designate the minimum level of coverage neces-
sary for insurance plans to comply with the ACA.  The plan would
also list the treatments that must be covered under the essential health
benefit and nondiscrimination provisions of the Act.  Certainly, craft-
ing this plan and ensuring that it complied with the many provisions of
the ACA would be time-consuming for HHS, although not necessarily
any more time consuming than what HHS is already asking the states
to do.
One time-saving possibility for HHS would be to select the lowest-
coverage insurance plan offered to federal employees as the federal
benchmark plan.  States (and insurance companies within the states)
could then use that plan’s handbook to determine which treatments
and conditions must be covered in other insurance plans.  Whether
HHS pursued this time-saving strategy or developed a benchmark
plan from scratch, in subsequent years, HHS would have the authority
282. JUSTIN GIOVANNELLI ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE ACA’S ES-
SENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS REQUIREMENTS 5 exh.5 (2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2014/oct/
1783_giovannelli_implementing_aca_essential_hlt_benefits_rb.pdf.
283. See id. at 4 exh.4.
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to amend the plan based on new developments from court decisions
and from medical treatments.  And, if individual state laws required
more extensive insurance coverage guarantees than provided by the
federal benchmark plan, states would still be able to develop their
own benchmark plans that guaranteed the minimum federal bench-
mark plan coverage supplemented by the additional coverage re-
quired by state law.284
The passage of the ACA is a source of great pride for President
Barack Obama’s Administration, and the President undoubtedly
hopes that the ACA will be his greatest legacy.285  As a result, it is
difficult to understand why, under his administration, HHS has relin-
quished its rulemaking authority to the states regarding the core guar-
antees of the Act.  For the individuals living in states in which
promised essential health benefits have not yet become a reality, HHS
has offered a glimmer of hope.  In 2012, the agency released a bulletin
stating that it would “revisit” its approach of allowing states to define
required insurance benefits for the 2016 plan year.286  Whether HHS
will follow through on this assurance remains uncertain—so far, there
are no signs of HHS making any changes, even though 2016 has ar-
rived.  What is certain is that until the agency follows through on this
assurance, many of the ACA’s core promises will remain unfulfilled.
284. For instance, Massachusetts law, requires insurance coverage for abortion treatment,
which is not required under the ACA.  See Patrick Whelan, Abortion Rates and Universal Health
Care, 362 N. ENG. J. MED. e45(1) (2010), for a discussion of the Massachusetts health care law,
which famously implemented “universal” health care four years before the passage of the ACA.
285. For a discussion of the ACA and the legacy of the Obama administration, see Michael D.
Shear, Obama Gains Vindication and Secures Legacy with Health Care Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/us/politics/obama-supreme-court-aca-ruling-health-
care.html?_r=0.
286. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICARE SERVS.,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON ESSENTIAL BENEFITS BULLETIN (Feb. 17, 2012), https://
www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/ehb-faq-508.pdf.
